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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
NONMULTILATERAL ERA
Peter K. Yu
Abstract
In the past decade, countries have actively established bilateral,
plurilateral, and regional trade and investment agreements, such as the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement. Although commentators have examined the conflict and
tension between intellectual property and human rights in the past, the
arrival of these agreements has ushered in a new era of nonmultilateralism
that warrants a reexamination of the complex interrelationship between
intellectual property and human rights. This Article closely examines the
human rights impact of the intellectual property provisions in TRIPS-plus
nonmultilateral agreements. It begins by outlining the challenges inherent
in any analysis of the interface between intellectual property and human
rights. It then examines the relationship between these agreements and the
human rights system. The Article concludes with a discussion of the
normative and systemic adjustments needed to alleviate the tension or
conflict between these agreements and the international human rights
system.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, the European Union and the United States have
actively established bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade and
investment agreements.1 While the United States developed free trade
1. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (Christopher Heath
& Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007) (collecting essays discussing free trade agreements in
the intellectual property context); Pedro Roffe et al., Intellectual Property Rights in Free Trade
Agreements: Moving Beyond TRIPS Minimum Standards, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER WTO RULES 266 (Carlos M. Correa ed., 2010)
(discussing free trade agreements in relation to the TRIPS framework); Robert Burrell & Kimberlee
Weatherall, Exporting Controversy? Reactions to the Copyright Provisions of the U.S.-Australia
Free Trade Agreement: Lessons for U.S. Trade Policy, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 259
(criticizing the U.S.–Australia Free Trade Agreement); Jean-Frédéric Morin, Multilateralizing
TRIPs-Plus Agreements: Is the US Strategy a Failure?, 12 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 175 (2009)
(examining the United States’ free trade agreement strategy); Peter K. Yu, Currents and
Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 392–
400 (2004) [hereinafter Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents] (discussing the growing use of bilateral,
plurilateral, and regional trade agreements to push for higher intellectual property standards); Peter
K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953, 961–86 (2011) (critically examining
the strengths and weaknesses of bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements).
Although no clear distinctions exist between plurilateral agreements, regional agreements,
and multilateral agreements, “plurilateral agreements” tend to refer to those agreements that are
negotiated outside the traditional international or regional organizations or fora. The recently
adopted Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement is a good example. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M. 243 (2011) [hereinafter ACTA].
Plurilateral agreements can also have a “loose” regional focus. Simon Lester and Bryan Mercurio,
for example, define “‘loose’ regional trade agreements” as “plurilateral agreements among countries
which may or may not be in somewhat close proximity to each other, but do not necessarily include
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agreements (FTAs), with a strong focus on trade, investment, and related
areas, the European Union negotiated both FTAs and economic partnership
agreements (EPAs) with its trading partners. Compared with FTAs, EPAs
seek not only to promote free trade, but also to facilitate economic
integration and stimulate local development. In addition to the United
States and the European Union, emerging countries such as China2 and
India3 have negotiated their own nonmultilateral trade agreements.
Although these agreements bear some similarities to FTAs and EPAs, they
also differ significantly in terms of their language, underlying goals, and
negotiating approaches.4
It remains to be seen whether these myriad agreements will eventually
spark a race among the major trading powers, or even result in a “battle of
the FTAs.”5 It is also unclear whether the recent agreements will
subsequently be consolidated into a new multilateral arrangement.6
Nevertheless, there is no denying that the establishment of these
agreements has ushered in a new era of nonmultilateralism, which has
raised difficult questions concerning appropriate policy responses.7 The
arrival of this era has also rendered inadequate the existing literature on the
interrelationship among various international regimes.
The relationship between intellectual property and human rights is an
area that deserves our renewed attention. Although commentators have
all countries from that area.” Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio, Introduction to BILATERAL AND
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES 1, 2 (Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio eds., 2008)
[hereinafter BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS].
2. For discussions of China’s free trade agreements, or what I have termed “Sinic trade
agreements,” see generally Henry Gao, The RTA Strategy of China: A Critical Visit, in CHALLENGES
TO MULTILATERAL TRADE: THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL, PREFERENTIAL AND REGIONAL AGREEMENTS
53 (Ross Buckley et al. eds., 2008); Marc Lanteigne, Northern Exposure: Cross-Regionalism and
the China-Iceland Preferential Trade Negotiations, 202 CHINA Q. 362 (2010); Yu, Sinic Trade
Agreements, supra note 1.
3. See Julia Ya Qin, China, India and WTO Law, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER 167, 196 (Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah & Wang Jiangyu eds., 2010) (“It was
not until recent years that India began to enter into regional free trade arrangements with others,
mostly its neighbouring countries.”); Wang Jiangyu, The Role of China and India in Asian
Regionalism, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra, at 333, 356–58
(discussing India’s regional trade initiatives).
4. See Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 1, at 986–1018 (discussing the different
underlying goals and negotiating approaches of China’s nonmultilateral agreements).
5. See id. at 1018–27 (identifying three potential “battles of the FTAs” caused by the
differences between FTAs and EPAs on the one hand and China’s nonmultilateral agreements on
the other).
6. See id. at 976 (noting that “bilateral and plurilateral agreements can help drive new norms
that will be eventually consolidated in a multilateral setting”).
7. See Peter K. Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1, 9–12 (2011) (discussing
the rise of the nonmultilateral era). Policy adjustments will become even more important if this era
continues for an extended period of time, as opposed to serving as a mere temporary transition
before countries return their focus to the multilateral system.
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examined at length the conflict and tension between these two regimes, as
well as the human rights impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement),8 the
intellectual property provisions in nonmultilateral agreements have
generated new issues and problems while bringing to the debate many new
voices. With the recent adoption of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA)9 and the ongoing negotiation of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement (TPP),10 it is high time we revisit the debate on
intellectual property and human rights.
This Article closely examines the human rights impact of the
intellectual property provisions in TRIPS-plus nonmultilateral agreements.
Part I demonstrates that the debate on intellectual property and human
rights deserves our renewed attention. This Part further identifies five sets
of new developments that justify a reexamination of the complex interplay
between intellectual property and human rights.
Part II outlines the challenges inherent in any analysis of the interface
between intellectual property and human rights. Building on the human
rights framework for intellectual property I have previously developed,11
this Part notes the overlap between the intellectual property rights
protected under TRIPS-plus nonmultilateral agreements and the rights
recognized in existing international or regional human rights instruments.
It underscores the importance of distinguishing the human rights attributes
of intellectual property rights from the non-human rights aspects of
intellectual property protection.
Part III examines the relationship between TRIPS-plus nonmultilateral
8. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
9. ACTA, supra note 1; see also Yu, supra note 7 (discussing the complex politics behind
the negotiation of ACTA); Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52 IDEA
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1948326 [hereinafter Yu, What
Enforcement?] (suggesting ways to improve the design of an anticounterfeiting trade agreement);
Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975 [hereinafter Yu, Six
Secret Fears] (discussing the serious concerns about ACTA).
10. See Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/
tpp (last visited Sept. 19, 2011) (providing up-to-date information about the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement). See generally Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific Partnership:
New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27 (2011) (discussing
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement); Peter K. Yu, The Alphabet Soup of Transborder
Intellectual Property Enforcement, DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE, forthcoming June 2012, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2054950 (discussing why TPP is likely to be more dangerous than ACTA
from a public interest standpoint).
11. See generally Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human
Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039 (2007) (exploring ways to develop a human rights
framework for intellectual property and to resolve the tension and conflict between human rights
and the non-human rights aspects of intellectual property protection).
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agreements and the human rights system. This Part discusses the
compatibilities between intellectual property provisions in these
agreements and the human rights system as well as the resulting synergies
created within the system. This Part also examines the various
impediments nonmultilateral agreements pose to greater protection of
human rights. It discusses, in particular, the conflicts and inconsistencies
within these agreements, the lost opportunities for promoting human rights,
and the indirect systemic tension that the agreements have generated within
the human rights system.
Part IV concludes with a discussion of normative and systemic
adjustments that seek to alleviate the tension or conflict between TRIPSplus nonmultilateral agreements and the international human rights system.
It is my hope that these adjustments will help to strike a more appropriate
balance between the protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights and the commitments made in international or regional human rights
instruments.
I. REVISITING THE DEBATE
Until recently, policy makers, scholars, and activists have paid little
attention to the implications of the intellectual property system for the
protection of human rights.12 Their lack of interest was due in part to the
arcane, obscure, complex, and highly technical nature of intellectual
property law and policy13 and in part to the ability of countries to retain
substantial policy space for developing their own intellectual property
systems.14 When human rights issues arose, they were usually the result of
12. As Professors Laurence Helfer and Graeme Austin acknowledge:
Long ignored by both the human rights and intellectual property communities, the
relationship between these two fields has now captured the attention of
government officials, judges, activist communities, and scholars in domestic legal
systems and in international venues such as the World Intellectual Property
Organization, the United Nations Human Rights Council, the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the World Trade Organization, the World
Health Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization.
LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE 1 (2011).
13. See SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 99 (2003) (“To a certain extent IP law is reminiscent of the Catholic Church
when the Bible was in Latin. IP lawyers are privileged purveyors of expertise as was the Latintrained clergy.”); Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual
Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 975 (2007) (“Intellectual property has remained a normative
backwater in the burgeoning post-World War II human rights movement, neglected by international
tribunals, governments, and legal scholars while other rights emerged from the jurisprudential
shadows.”); Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 1, at 419 (2004) (“In the past, intellectual
property issues were considered arcane, obscure, complex, and highly technical.”).
14. See Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property
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decisions made at the domestic level, including those made under heavy
foreign pressure. Indeed, the two systems rarely interact with each other.
As Professors Laurence Helfer and Graeme Austin remind us:
Human rights law . . . offered neither a necessary nor a
sufficient justification for state-granted monopolies in
intangible knowledge goods; nor, conversely, did it serve to
check the expansion of intellectual property protection
standards . . . . [To a great extent,] each legal regime was
preoccupied with its own distinct concerns and neither saw
the other as either aiding or threatening its sphere of influence
or opportunities for expansion.15
That position changed, however, when the TRIPS Agreement entered
into force in January 1995. For the first time, the Agreement imposed a
supersize-fits-all template on less developed countries for the protection
and enforcement of intellectual property rights.16 The Agreement’s impact
was more transformative and far-reaching than that of preexisting
intellectual property conventions, such as the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property17 and the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.18 Because the TRIPS Agreement
introduced high, mandatory standards for the protection and enforcement
of intellectual property rights, many countries, in particular those in the
less developed world, lost considerable autonomy and policy space for
developing their own intellectual property systems.19
In view of the Agreement’s many deleterious effects on the protection
of human rights in less developed countries, human rights bodies and
commentators have lamented the conflict between the TRIPS Agreement
and the international human rights system. For example, in Resolution
2000/7 on “Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights,” the United
Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights (U.N. Sub-Commission) declared:
[A]ctual

or

potential

conflicts

exist

between

the

Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (discussing how the policy space of less developed
countries has been increasingly enclosed in the name of international harmonization).
15. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 33–34.
16. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 1, at 364–67 (discussing the
establishment of the TRIPS Agreement as a supranational code); Peter K. Yu, Teaching
International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 923, 928–33 (2008) (discussing the
transformational impact of the TRIPS Agreement on the field of intellectual property law).
17. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S.
305 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris Convention].
18. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) (revised at Paris July 24, 1971).
19. See Yu, supra note 14, at 7–9.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/6

6

Yu and Yu: Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era

2012]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

1051

implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the realization
of economic, social and cultural rights in relation to, inter
alia, impediments to the transfer of technology to developing
countries, the consequences for the enjoyment of the right to
food of plant variety rights and the patenting of genetically
modified organisms, “bio-piracy” and the reduction of
communities’ (especially indigenous communities’) control
over their own genetic and natural resources and cultural
values, and restrictions on access to patented pharmaceuticals
and the implications for the enjoyment of the right to health.20
A year later, in Resolution 2001/21, the Sub-Commission reiterated its
concerns about the conflicts between intellectual property and human
rights.21 While the problems brought about by the TRIPS Agreement were
serious, the international community’s growing attention to the protection
of traditional peoples, indigenous communities, and their knowledge and
cultural expressions made the conflicts more salient.22
Coming to the defense of the intellectual property system, the World
Trade Organization (WTO) noted the potential for the intellectual property
and human rights systems to coexist.23 Instead of focusing on conflicts, the
WTO emphasized the flexibilities built into the TRIPS Agreement and
20. Sub-Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2000/7, Intellectual Property Rights and Human
Rights, 52d Sess., July 31–Aug. 18, 2000, pmbl., recital 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7
(Aug. 17, 2000), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/c462b62cf8a07b13c
12569700046704e?Opendocument [hereinafter Resolution 2000/7].
21. See Sub-Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2001/21, Intellectual Property and Human
Rights, 53d Sess., July 30–Aug. 17, 2001, pmbl., recital 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2001/21
(Aug. 16, 2001), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.
4.Sub.2.RES.2001.21.En?Opendocument (“Reiterating that actual or potential conflict exists
between the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the realization of economic, social and
cultural rights, in particular the rights to self-determination, food, housing, work, health and
education, and in relation to transfers of technology to developing countries . . . .”).
22. See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 432 (“[T]he increased attention given to the
rights of indigenous peoples by U.N. agencies in the 1990s was among the catalysts that encouraged
international human rights bodies to address intellectual property issues.” (footnote omitted)).
23. As the WTO declared:
Rights under article 27.2 of the UDHR and article 15.1(c) of the ICESCR together
with other human rights will be best served, taking into account their
interdependent nature, by reaching an optimal balance within the IP system and by
other related policy responses. Human rights can be used—and have been and are
currently being used—to argue in favour of balancing the system either upwards
or downwards by means of adjusting the existing rights or by creating new rights.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Protection of Intellectual
Property Under the TRIPS Agreement, 24th Sess., Nov. 13–Dec. 1, 2000, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2000/18 (Nov. 27, 2000) (by WTO Secretariat), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/
doc.nsf/0/292864197888d603c12569ba00543291?Opendocument.
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other international trade agreements.24 The U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights also declared that “[t]he balance between public and private
interests found under [the international human rights instruments] is one
familiar to intellectual property law.”25
The debate on intellectual property and human rights therefore has
generated two opposing camps: one embracing the conflict approach and
the other the coexistence approach.26 While the conflict approach views the
two sets of rights as being in fundamental conflict, the coexistence
approach considers them essentially compatible.
This debate was refined in 2006 by the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in General Comment No. 17.27 This
24. See id. (pointing out that the “TRIPS Agreement provides a fair amount of leeway”).
25. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Impact of the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights: Rep. of the High Commissioner,
¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/590516104e92e87bc1256aa800
4a8191/$FI LE/G0114345.pdf [hereinafter High Commissioner’s Report]; see also Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“[I]t should not be forgotten that the
Framers [of the U.S. Constitution] intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.”);
Estelle Derclaye, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights: Coinciding and Cooperating, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 133, 134 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2008) (“[H]uman
rights and [intellectual property rights] do not ‘simply’ coexist but in fact most of them coincide
from the outset, that is, they have the same goal . . . and as a result, in most cases, because of this
similarity or identity of goals, they even ‘cooperate’ . . . .”); Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property
and Human Rights: Learning to Live Together, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra, at 3, 12 (“Human rights and intellectual property were natural law cousins owing to their
shared filiation with equity.”).
26. Professor Helfer summarizes the two approaches:
The first approach views human rights and intellectual property as being in
fundamental conflict. This framing sees strong intellectual property protection as
undermining—and therefore as incompatible with—a broad spectrum of human
rights obligations, especially in the area of economic, social, and cultural rights.
The prescription that proponents of this approach advocate for resolving this
conflict is to recognize the normative primacy of human rights law over
intellectual property law in areas where specific treaty obligations conflict.
The second approach to the intersection of human rights and intellectual
property sees both areas of law as concerned with the same fundamental question:
defining the appropriate scope of private monopoly power that gives authors and
inventors a sufficient incentive to create and innovate, while ensuring that the
consuming public has adequate access to the fruits of their efforts. This school
views human rights law and intellectual property law as essentially compatible,
although often disagreeing over where to strike the balance between incentives on
the one hand and access on the other.
Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 MINN.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 47, 48–49 (2003) (footnotes omitted); see also Paul L.C. Torremans, Copyright
(and Other Intellectual Property Rights) as a Human Right, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 195, 196–97 (discussing the two different approaches).
27. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment
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authoritative interpretation of Article 15(1)(c) of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)28 made clear
that not all attributes of intellectual property rights have human rights
status.29 As it explained in great depth:
Human rights are fundamental as they are inherent to the
human person as such, whereas intellectual property rights are
first and foremost means by which States seek to provide
incentives for inventiveness and creativity, encourage the
dissemination of creative and innovative productions, as well
as the development of cultural identities, and preserve the
integrity of scientific, literary and artistic productions for the
benefit of society as a whole.
In contrast to human rights, intellectual property rights are
generally of a temporary nature, and can be revoked, licensed
or assigned to someone else. While under most intellectual
property systems, intellectual property rights, often with the
exception of moral rights, may be allocated, limited in time
and scope, traded, amended and even forfeited, human rights
are timeless expressions of fundamental entitlements of the
human person. Whereas the human right to benefit from the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
one’s scientific, literary and artistic productions safeguards
the personal link between authors and their creations and
between peoples, communities, or other groups and their
collective cultural heritage, as well as their basic material
interests which are necessary to enable authors to enjoy an
adequate standard of living, intellectual property regimes
primarily protect business and corporate interests and
investments. Moreover, the scope of protection of the moral
and material interests of the author provided for by article 15,
paragraph 1(c), does not necessarily coincide with what is
referred to as intellectual property rights under national
legislation or international agreements.
It is therefore important not to equate intellectual
property rights with the human right recognized in article 15,
No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests
Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the Author
(Article 15, Paragraph 1(c), of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006), available
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,LEGAL,CESCR,,,441543594,0.html [hereinafter
General Comment No. 17].
28. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15(1)(c), Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force January 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
29. See General Comment No. 17, supra note 27, ¶ 1.
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paragraph 1(c).30
Notwithstanding the differences between these two sets of rights, the
CESCR recognized that some attributes of intellectual property rights
“derive[] from the inherent dignity and worth of all persons.”31 These
attributes are therefore protected under the ICESCR—and most likely
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as well.32
In the wake of General Comment No. 17, a number of scholars
explored the need to develop a human rights framework for intellectual
property.33 In a symposium on intellectual property and social justice,
Professor Laurence Helfer utilized the CESCR’s documents to flesh out
this framework, offering suggestions on how to mediate law and policy in
the fields of intellectual property and human rights.34 Professor Kal
Raustiala “question[ed] whether the infusion of human rights concepts and
rhetoric will serve, on balance, to make international [intellectual property]
rights more socially just, or just more powerful.”35 Taking a cue from
Professor Helfer, I also explored ways to develop this framework and to
resolve the tension and conflict between human rights and the non-human
rights aspects of intellectual property protection.36
At a much broader level, human rights concerns have been raised
frequently and vocally in the debates concerning access to medicines,37
access to knowledge,38 and the protection of traditional knowledge and

30. Id. ¶¶ 1–3 (emphasis added).
31. Id. ¶ 1.
32. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
33. See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 13; Yu, supra note 11.
34. See Helfer, supra note 13, at 977.
35. Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law, 40 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1023 (2007).
36. See generally Yu, supra note 11.
37. See Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2004/26, Access to Medication in the Context of
Pandemics Such as HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 60th Sess., Mar. 15–Apr. 23, 2004, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2004/26 (Apr. 16, 2004), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/
resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-2004-26.doc.
38. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “from Below”: Copyright and Capability for
Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 819 (2007) (“To the extent that development is driven not
only by economic growth but also by cultural and social change, education is foundational.”); Ruth
L. Okediji, The International Copyright System: Limitations, Exceptions and Public Interest
Considerations for Developing Countries 2 (Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper
No. 15, 2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc200610_en.pdf (“[W]ith regard to
education and basic scientific knowledge, limitations and exceptions are an important component in
creating an environment in which domestic economic initiatives and development policies can take
root. A well-informed, educated and skilled citizenry is indispensable to the development
process.”).
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cultural expressions.39 Two edited volumes exploring the complex
interrelationship between intellectual property and human rights have also
been published—one by Professor Paul Torremans of the University of
Nottingham40 and the other by Professor Willem Grosheide of Utrecht
University.41 In 2011, Cambridge University Press published a highly
welcome text: Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Mapping the
Global Interface, by Professors Helfer and Austin.42 This new text will
likely inspire the development of new seminars while shaping the next
generation of human rights scholars interested in intellectual property
issues.
In light of this growing volume of literature, one may hesitate to revisit
the debate on intellectual property and human rights. This Article,
however, argues that we should not hesitate. The gravity of the issues
involved and the wide implications of the debate on intellectual property
and human rights provide a strong justification for scholars to undertake
research in the area. The changing laws, policies, technologies, and
practices have also brought about five sets of new developments that
justify a reexamination of the complex interrelationship between
intellectual property and human rights.
First, countries have actively utilized nonmultilateral agreements to
provide new and higher standards for the protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights. While this trend predated the publication of a
wide array of human rights documents43 and legal literature examining the
interrelationship between intellectual property and human rights, the recent
adoption of ACTA and the ongoing negotiation of TPP have increased our
urgency to revisit the debate on intellectual property and human rights.
Consider, for example, ACTA, a highly controversial plurilateral
agreement that sought to raise the standards of intellectual property
protection and enforcement beyond the TRIPS requirements.44 This
anticounterfeiting agreement facilitates the provision of ex officio authority
to suspend allegedly infringing goods.45 It also calls for the introduction of
39. See High Commissioner’s Report, supra note 25, ¶ 65 (encouraging “the adaptation of IP
systems so that they fully take into account cultural and other rights of indigenous and local
communities”); Peter K. Yu, Ten Common Questions About Intellectual Property and Human
Rights, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 740–44 (2007) (discussing the protection of human rights in
relation to the interests of indigenous peoples and traditional communities).
40. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 25.
41. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A PARADOX (Willem Grosheide ed., 2010)
[hereinafter A PARADOX].
42. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 12.
43. See id. at 53–56 (listing the various documents).
44. See ACTA, supra note 1, pmbl., recital 4 (“Intending to provide effective and appropriate
means, complementing the TRIPS Agreement, for the enforcement of intellectual property rights,
taking into account differences in their respective legal systems and practices . . . .”).
45. See id. arts. 16.1(a)–.2(a); see also Frederick M. Abbott, Trading’s End: Is ACTA the
Leading Edge of a Protectionist Wave?, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (May 6, 2011, 2:48 PM),
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preestablished or statutory damages46 and criminal penalties for activities
that infringe on copyrights, even though such infringements have only
“indirect economic or commercial advantage.”47 Depending on its
implementation, ACTA could affect how injunctions are granted and
damages calculated.48 The Agreement might even result in the creation of
new penalties for “aiding and abetting” intellectual property
infringements.49
Even worse, many countries have questioned the legitimacy of this
plurilateral agreement, due largely to the developed countries’ use of a
“country club” approach to set a higher benchmark among like-minded
countries.50 Exemplifying this concern was the participation of only two
less developed countries—Mexico and Morocco—in the negotiations
beyond the first round.51 Even if one counts Jordan and the United Arab
Emirates, which participated only in the first round, no more than four
percent of the world’s developing-country governments were involved in
the ACTA negotiations.52
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/05/06/trading%e2%80%99s-end-is-acta-the-leading-edge-ofa-protectionist-wave/ (“Probably the most problematic provisions mandate that customs authorities
be enabled to act ex officio to seize ‘suspect goods’ at the border, without definition of the basis for
suspicion, and without mandating that a determination be made regarding the offense the suspect
goods allegedly commit.”).
46. See ACTA, supra note 1, art. 9.3. Article 9.3 specifically provides:
At least with respect to infringement of copyright or related rights protecting
works, phonograms, and performances, and in cases of trademark counterfeiting,
each Party shall also establish or maintain a system that provides for one or more
of the following:
(a) pre-established damages; or
(b) presumptions for determining the amount of damages sufficient to
compensate the right holder for the harm caused by the infringement; or
(c) at least for copyright, additional damages.
Id. (footnote omitted). For criticisms of preestablished or statutory damages, see generally Pamela
Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009); Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal
Transplants in Hong Kong, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693, 716–19 (2010); J. Cam Barker, Note,
Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects of
Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525 (2004).
47. ACTA, supra note 1, art. 23.1.
48. See generally James Love, Comments on ACTA Provisions on Injunctions and Damages,
JAMES LOVE’S BLOG (Apr. 6, 2010, 9:29 PM), http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/kei_rn_
2010_1.pdf (discussing the ACTA provisions on injunctions and damages).
49. See ACTA, supra note 1, art. 23.4 (“With respect to the offences specified in [Article 23]
for which a Party provides criminal procedures and penalties, that Party shall ensure that criminal
liability for aiding and abetting is available under its law.”).
50. See generally Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 9, at 1074–83 (criticizing the “country
club” approach).
51. See ACTA, supra note 1, art. 39 n.17.
52. An article in Inside U.S. Trade suggested that Uruguay might have also been involved in
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Moreover, the adoption of ACTA and the ongoing negotiation of TPP
have rendered inadequate many of the existing analyses of the tension or
conflict between the TRIPS Agreement and the human rights system. For
example, although the High Commissioner for Human Rights
recommended that “developing countries be cautious about enacting
‘TRIPS plus’ legislation . . . without first understanding the impact of such
legislation on the protection of human rights,”53 her report did not
anticipate that plurilateral agreements would be used primarily to
circumvent the multilateral process. To a great extent, the development of
ACTA, TPP, and other nonmultilateral agreements has brought intellectual
property issues to the forefront of the human rights debate.
Second, the increased sophistication of piracy and counterfeiting
networks54 and the rapid development of potentially disruptive digital
technology55 have necessitated the introduction of new enforcement
measures at both the domestic and international levels.56 While some of
these measures were designed to address traditional cross-border issues—
issues that were present, but not successfully resolved during the TRIPS
negotiations57—others were created as responses to problems brought
about by the advent of the World Wide Web and the proliferation of new
communications technologies.58
A case in point is the recent introduction of the graduated response
system—or what some commentators and policy makers have termed the
“three strikes” rule or the “notice and termination” procedure.59 Targeting
unauthorized copying on the Internet, this system enables Internet service
providers to take a wide variety of actions after giving users warnings
about their potentially illegal online file-sharing activities.60 Permissible
the prenegotiation discussions. EU ACTA Negotiator Confirms EU Wants Patent Provisions in
ACTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 8, 2009, at 11.
53. High Commissioner’s Report, supra note 25, ¶ 69.
54. See TIMOTHY P. TRAINER & VICKI E. ALLUMS, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS 618 (2008) (stating that “greater enforcement efforts are needed given the
increasing sophistication of counterfeiters and pirates”).
55. For discussions of the massive unauthorized copying problem created by peer-to-peer
technology, see generally Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
653 (2005); Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907 (2004).
56. See Yu, What Enforcement?, supra note 9.
57. See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 483–504
(2011) (discussing the weaknesses of the TRIPS enforcement provisions).
58. See id. at 502–03.
59. For discussions of the gradated response system, see generally Annemarie Bridy,
Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L.
REV. 81 (2010); Eldar Haber, The French Revolution 2.0: Copyright and the Three Strikes Policy, 2
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 297 (2011); Alain Strowel, Internet Piracy as a Wake-up Call for
Copyright Law Makers—Is the “Graduated Response” a Good Reply?, 1 WIPO J. 75 (2009); Peter
K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373 (2010).
60. See Yu, supra note 59, at 1374.
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actions include suspensions or terminations of service; capping of
bandwidth; and blocking of sites, portals, and protocols. To date, Chile,
France, South Korea, and Taiwan have adopted this system, while
Germany, Hong Kong, Spain, Sweden, and the European Parliament have
rejected it.61
Third, with the growing use of the Internet and new communications
technologies, the tension between intellectual property and human rights is
no longer limited to economic, social, and cultural rights.62 Instead, the
debate also implicates civil and political rights, rights that many in Europe
and the United States have considered of a higher priority.63 The resulting
elevated status of the conflict between intellectual property and human
rights has also awakened many individuals and communities who
otherwise would not engage in the debate. These new voices express a
wide array of concerns that have not been fully articulated until now.
Fourth, as individuals continue to participate in creative communities,
producing what commentators have euphemistically described as “usergenerated content,”64 the protection of human rights interests in intellectual
creations is no longer limited to a subclass of individual authors.65 Such
limitation reminds us of the concerns raised by delegates during the
drafting of the UDHR. As British delegate F. Corbet noted, “[T]he
declaration of human rights should be universal in nature and only
recognize general principles that were valid for all men [and women].”66
Alan Watt, the Australian delegate, concurred, adding that “the
indisputable rights of the intellectual worker could not appear beside
61. See INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2011, at 3, 19
(2011), available at http://ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2012.pdf; Yu, supra note 59, at 1377.
62. Thanks to Xavier Seuba for pointing this out.
63. See MATTHEW C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 9 (1995) (“Western States . . . asserted the
priority of civil and political rights as being the foundation of liberty and democracy in the ‘free
world.’”); JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 27 (2d ed. 2003)
(“We should . . . note that in some Western circles a lingering suspicion of economic and social
rights persists.”).
64. Commentators and industry representatives have questioned the term “user-generated
content.” Compare Alan N. Braverman & Terri Southwick, The User-Generated Content
Principles: The Motivation, Process, Results and Lessons Learned, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 471,
471 (2009) (“UGC . . . is not always user-generated; it would more accurately be called user-posted
content.”), and Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of UserGenerated Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 842 (2009) (“Let me be perfectly clear: there
is no such thing as ‘user-generated content.’”), with Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Content and
the Future of Copyright: Part One—Investiture of Ownership, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 863,
870–74 (2008) (providing a definition of user-generated content).
65. See JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS,
DRAFTING, AND INTENT 221 (1999) (recounting that Mexican delegate Pablo Campos Ortiz
identified the right to the protection of interests in intellectual creations as a right of the individual
as “an intellectual worker, artist, scientist or writer”).
66. Id.
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fundamental rights of a more general nature, such as freedom of thought,
religious freedom or the right to work.”67 The sentiments of both delegates
echoed those voiced earlier by delegates from India and the United
Kingdom who “felt that no special group should be singled out for
attention.”68
Thanks to new technology and increased digital literacy, the ability to
create today is no longer limited to a small subclass of “intellectual
workers” or “creative laborers.” Instead, a growing number of individuals
from both developed and less developed countries now have the ability to
exploit their rights to the protection of the moral and material interests in
intellectual creations.69 As this community of creative individuals grows,
these rights will become more universal in nature, with most considering
them valid for all humans. The present technological and cultural
environments have therefore rendered irrelevant those earlier concerns
raised during the drafting of the UDHR.
To some extent, the increasing focus on the authors’ human rights has
made the intellectual property system more author-centric.70 There also
remain very challenging questions concerning whether the right to create
should include the right to use others’ creations to create—a perennial
debate among copyright scholars.71 Notwithstanding these complex
questions, there is no question that we continue to need a vibrant debate on
intellectual property and human rights.
Finally, the U.N. human rights bodies have undertaken many important
activities since the release of General Comment No. 17, the last major
impetus driving the recent scholarship on intellectual property and human
rights. In December 2009, the CESCR released General Comment No. 21,
67. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 185; MORSINK, supra note 65, at 221.
68. MORSINK, supra note 65, at 220; see also Audrey R. Chapman, Core Obligations Related
to ICESCR Article 15(1)(c), in CORE OBLIGATIONS: BUILDING A FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 305, 313 (Audrey Chapman & Sage Russell eds., 2002) [hereinafter CORE
OBLIGATIONS] (stating that “other members of the [UDHR] drafting committee claimed that special
protection for intellectual property entailed an elitist perspective”).
69. The universal nature of the right to the protection of interests in intellectual creations was
first asserted by Chang Peng-chun, the Chinese delegate and one of the Declaration’s key drafters.
Taking a populist approach, he noted that “the purpose of the joint amendment [from Cuba, France
and Mexico to include such a right] was not merely to protect creative artists but to safeguard the
interests of everyone.” MORSINK, supra note 65, at 221–22. Nevertheless, his primary focus was on
the need to protect the integrity of the creative work for the benefit of all individuals. As he
explained, “Literary, artistic and scientific works should be made accessible to the people directly in
their original form. This could only be done if the moral rights of the creative artist were protected.”
Id. at 222.
70. See Yu, supra note 11, at 1131 (“[T]he recognition of the human rights attributes of
intellectual property rights may challenge the structure of the traditional intellectual property
system. In the copyright context, for example, such recognition will encourage the development of
an author-centered regime, rather than one that is publisher-centered.”).
71. See Yu, supra note 59, at 1399–1400.
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a new interpretative comment on “the right of everyone . . . [t]o take part in
cultural life” as recognized in Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR.72 The
Committee is also in the process of drafting an additional general comment
on “the right of everyone . . . [t]o enjoy the benefits of scientific progress
and its applications” as recognized in Article 15(1)(b) of the ICESCR.73
Moreover, the year 2011 celebrates the silver anniversary of the
Declaration on the Right to Development, 74 which the U.N. General
Assembly adopted in December 1986. Such celebration is particularly
timely in light of the many development agendas that have recently sprung
up at the WTO, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the
World Health Organization (WHO), and in other international fora
governing biological diversity, food and agriculture, and information and
communications.75 An increased focus on the right to development is also
important in light of the growing concern among less developed countries
that their more developed counterparts are circumventing the multilateral
process in an effort to establish new and higher standards of intellectual
property enforcement.76
In sum, the human rights impact of the intellectual property system
remains an important issue deserving our renewed attention. The arrival of
new nonmultilateral agreements and the rapid changes in the cultural,
economic, and technological environments have generated new issues
previously unexplored in great depth. The stakes implicated by
nonmultilateral agreements and new enforcement measures are also much
higher than those implicated by the TRIPS Agreement. It is therefore high
time we revisit the debate on intellectual property and human rights.
72. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 21: Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (Art. 15, Para. 1(a), of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (Dec. 21, 2009),
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/gc/E-C-12-GC-21.doc.
73. See Press Release, Public Consultation, The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific
Progress and Its Applications: Consultation Organized by the Independent Expert in the Field of
Cultural Rights, Ms. Farida Shaheed, Palais des Nations, Room XXIII (Dec. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/CulturalRights/Pages/Consultation7December2011.aspx (providing
information about the public consultation).
74. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 41st
Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986), available at http://www.un.org/en/events/rightto
development/declaration.shtml.
75. See Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 465, 522–
40 (2009).
76. See Minutes of Meeting, Council for TRIPS, World Trade Org. ¶¶ 248–73, IP/C/M/63
(Oct. 4, 2010), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=&doc=
D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FIP%2FC%2FM63%2EDOC%2EHTM (reporting about
China and India’s interventions at the June 2010 TRIPS Council meeting, in which they heavily
criticized the ACTA negotiations and the highly disturbing trend of establishing TRIPS-plus
enforcement standards); see also Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 9, at 1074–83 (criticizing the
developed countries’ use of the “country club” approach to circumvent the multilateral process).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/6

16

Yu and Yu: Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era

2012]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

1061

II. INHERENT ANALYTICAL CHALLENGES
Notwithstanding the importance and urgency of examining the human
rights impact of TRIPS-plus nonmultilateral agreements, the analysis of the
relationship between intellectual property and human rights is fraught with
challenges. Consider the following questions: Which forms or attributes of
intellectual property rights should be protected at the level of human
rights? Which rights should be considered under the rubric of “human
rights” for the purpose of the analysis? Can corporate rights holders
possess human rights at all? This Part explores each of these questions in
turn.
The answers to these questions inevitably depend on one’s worldview,
basic assumptions, ideological values, and philosophical predispositions.
For instance, the approach taken in this Article is unlikely to convince
those who insist that no intellectual property right can attain human rights
status. Likewise, the approach will not appeal to those who see very little
value in a human rights discourse in the intellectual property debate. Thus,
rather than convincing readers to subscribe to the approach laid out in this
Article and my previous scholarship, this Part seeks to inform readers
about my assumptions and choices. Readers can then adjust their analyses
based on their own basic theoretical assumptions, ideological values, and
philosophical predispositions.
A. IP Rights as Human Rights?
The first challenge concerns the human rights attributes of intellectual
property rights. As discussed earlier, policy makers, international
bureaucrats, academic commentators, and civil society organizations
traditionally examine the interface between intellectual property and
human rights by using either the conflict approach or the coexistence
approach.77 Although each of these approaches has benefits and
drawbacks, both ignore the fact that some attributes of intellectual property
rights are protected in international human rights instruments while other
attributes do not have any human rights basis. For example, it is rather easy
to identify the human rights basis of copyrights and, to some extent,
patents,78 but it is much harder to justify human rights protection for
77. See supra Part I.
78. See Yu, supra note 39, at 721–26 (discussing the question concerning whether patents
should be separated from copyrights in the human rights debate). But see Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights: Where Is the Paradox?, in A PARADOX, supra note 41, at 73
(“As a theoretical matter, there are clearly dimensions to intellectual property that sound in human
rights concerns (rights to protect one’s dignity, to be compensated for one’s labor, and to enjoy
one’s property without arbitrary governmental interference). But at least on the patent side, there is
little reason to think that the human rights concerns associated with creative labor must be furthered
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corporate trademarks and trade secrets, works made for hire, employee
inventions, neighboring rights for broadcasters and phonogram producers,
database protection, protection for clinical trial data, and other rights that
primarily protect the economic investments of institutional authors and
inventors.79
Thus, instead of inquiring whether intellectual property and human
rights conflict or coexist with each other, it is important to distinguish the
human rights attributes of intellectual property rights from the non-human
rights aspects of intellectual property protection. Article 27(2) of the
UDHR states, “Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he [or she] is the author.”80Article 15(1)(c) of the
ICESCR also requires state parties to “recognize the right of
everyone . . . [t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of
which he [or she] is the author.”81
In view of these provisions, the tension between TRIPS-plus
nonmultilateral agreements and the international human rights system is
not simple categorical tension between intellectual property rights and
human rights. Rather, tension exists between the non-human rights aspects
of intellectual property protection and human rights, including the human
rights attributes of intellectual property rights. Although commentators
tend to emphasize the conflict between intellectual property rights and
human rights, the intellectual property provisions in nonmultilateral
agreements, in certain circumstances, can create synergy between the
two.82

by recognizing a right to full control over the information that creative labor produces.”); Wendy J.
Gordon, Current Patent Laws Cannot Claim the Backing of Human Rights, in A PARADOX, supra
note 41, at 155–56 (dispelling “the notion that current patent laws are the manifestation of the
human right commitment to authors under the ICESCR”).
79. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Social Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights,
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Drafting
History of the Article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, ¶ 45, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/15 (Oct. 9, 2000) (by Maria Green) [hereinafter Drafting
History of the Article 15(1)(c)], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c
1256a450044f331/872a8f7775c9823cc1256999005c3088/$FILE/G0044899.pdf (“[T]he drafters
[of the ICESCR] do not seem to have been thinking in terms of the corporation-held patent, or the
situation where the creator is simply an employee of the entity that holds the patent or the
copyright.”); Chapman, supra note 68, at 316–17 (noting that there is no “basis in human rights to
justify using intellectual property instruments as a means to protect economic investments”).
80. UDHR, supra note 32, art. 27(2).
81. ICESCR, supra note 28, art. 15(1)(c).
82. See infra Part III.A.
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B. No Consensus on Human Rights?
The second challenge concerns the type of human rights that the
analysis should cover. Despite decades of efforts establishing the
international human rights system, countries have yet to agree on the
nature, scope, and meaning of human rights obligations. While the Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action states that “[a]ll human rights are
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated,”83 the document
is mostly aspirational. As mentioned earlier, many governments, policy
makers, and commentators still have yet to view all forms of human rights
as having the same weight and priority.84 Many of them continue to
prioritize civil and political rights over rights of later generations, such as
economic, social, and cultural rights (second-generation rights) or
collective rights for minorities, indigenous peoples, and traditional
communities (third-generation rights).85
83. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993), available at http://www.un
hchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En (“All human rights are universal,
indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.”).
84. See CRAVEN, supra note 63, at 9 (“Western States . . . asserted the priority of civil and
political rights as being the foundation of liberty and democracy in the ‘free world.’”); Rosemary J.
Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in International Law
Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59, 60 (1998) (“[E]conomic, social, and cultural rights have been juridically
marginalized in comparison to civil and political rights, both in terms of the institutional
frameworks developed for their implementation and in terms of their judicial interpretation . . . .”);
Helfer, supra note 13, at 987 (stating that economic, social, and cultural rights remain “the least
well-developed and the least doctrinally prescriptive”).
85. As Professor Matthew Craven explains:
That economic, social, and cultural rights have been identified as a discrete
category of human rights is most usually explained in terms of their distinct
historical origin. Economic, social, and cultural rights are frequently termed
“second generation” rights, deriving from the growth of socialist ideals in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the rise of the labour movement in
Europe. They contrast with the “first generation” civil and political rights
associated with the eighteenth-century Declarations on the Rights of Man, and the
“third generation” rights that encompass the rights of “peoples” or “groups”, such
as the right to self-determination and the right to development. In fact the reason
for making a distinction between first and second generation rights could be more
accurately put down to the ideological conflict between East and West pursued in
the arena of human rights during the drafting of the Covenants. The Soviet States,
on the one hand, championed the cause of economic, social, and cultural rights,
which they associated with the aims of the socialist society. Western States, on the
other hand, asserted the priority of civil and political rights as being the
foundation of liberty and democracy in the “free world”. The conflict was such
that during the drafting of the International Bill of Rights the intended treaty was
divided into two separate instruments which were later to become the ICCPR
[International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] and the ICESCR.
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To complicate matters, policy makers and commentators subscribe to
different conceptions of human rights. While some take a highly
philosophical approach that relies heavily on first principles and natural
law, others take a more positive approach that focuses on compromises in
existing international or regional human rights instruments. As Professor
Richard Falk observes:
The positivists consider the content of human rights to be
determined by the texts agreed upon by states and embodied
in valid treaties, or determined by obligatory state practice
attaining the status of binding international custom. The
naturalists, on the other hand, regard the content of human
rights as principally based upon immutable values that endow
standards and norms with a universal validity.86
Some commentators also question how relatively trivial matters such as
intellectual property rights can be equated with such fundamental rights as
the “prohibition on genocide, slavery, and torture; the rights to freedom of
thought, expression, association, and religion; and the rights to life, food,
health, basic education, and work.”87 That question was indeed raised
during the drafting of the UDHR. Alan Watt declared that “‘the
indisputable rights of the intellectual worker could not appear beside
fundamental rights of a more general nature, such as freedom of thought,
religious freedom or the right to work.’”88
Although both the philosophical and positive approaches have merits,
this Article focuses on the latter, for at least three reasons.89 First, the
CRAVEN, supra note 63, at 8–9; see also Asbjørn Eide & Allan Rosas, Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK
3–4 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 1995) (discussing use of the terms “first generation,” “second
generation,” and “third generation” to distinguish between different types of human rights).
86. Richard Falk, Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 44 (Abdullahi Ahmed
An-Naʿim ed., 1992); see also THOMAS W. POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
COSMOPOLITAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS 59 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the distinction
between legal and moral human rights).
87. Yu, supra note 39, at 713; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE xi (1991) (“A rapidly expanding catalog of rights . . . not
only multiplies the occasions for collisions, but it risks trivializing core democratic values. A
tendency to frame nearly every social controversy in terms of a clash of rights . . . impedes
compromise, mutual understanding, and the discovery of common ground.”); Philip Alston,
Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 607 (1984)
(expressing concern that the continuous proclamation of new human rights will undermine both the
fundamental nature of human rights and the integrity of the process of recognizing those rights).
88. MORSINK, supra note 65, at 221 (quoting Alan Watt, the Australian delegate).
89. This approach is not without its weaknesses. For example, Professors William Fisher and
Talha Syed identify two main weaknesses of the positivist approach:
First, by tying a right to health strictly to what is recognized in legal documents
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drafting histories of the UDHR and the ICESCR show that it is difficult for
countries to achieve a political consensus on the rights recognized in the
instruments.90 Given their divergent interests, backgrounds, beliefs, and
cultures, countries are very unlikely to succeed in achieving an
international philosophical consensus on these rights. As Professor Jack
Donnelly reminds us, “few issues in moral or political philosophy are more
contentious or intractable than theories of human nature.”91 Thus, it makes
great pragmatic sense to focus on rights that have already attained
international consensus, if not universal agreement.92
Second, international human rights instruments thus far have received
significant attention in the international debate concerning the human
rights implications of intellectual property protection. The plain language
of these instruments is therefore likely to have a significant impact on the
future development of the international intellectual property system. While
commentators may question whether the UDHR has achieved the status of
customary international law,93 this Declaration, along with other
the analysis limits its scope of protection to claims against governments acting
within their own sovereign territories (and, perhaps, only to certain types of
“negative” claims). Second, implementing the right requires knowing what its
substantive requirements should be and how tradeoffs with other rights or
priorities are to be made, and to answer those questions adequately we need to
draw on extra-legal normative considerations.
William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the
Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 642 (2007) (footnote omitted). “One could also add
a third weakness concerning how this approach would encourage one to ignore important goals and
interests that have strong moral bases but have yet to be recognized politically by the international
community.” Yu, supra note 39, at 716.
90. See generally Drafting History of the Article 15(1)(c), supra note 79 (providing a drafting
history of Article 15(1) of the ICESCR); MORSINK, supra note 65, at 217–22 (providing a detailed
drafting history of Article 27(2) of the UDHR); Yu, supra note 11, at 1047–75 (providing the
drafting history of the right to the protection of interests in intellectual creations in international
human rights instruments).
91. DONNELLY, supra note 63, at 16.
92. Cf. JAMES HARRISON, THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION
18–19 (2007) (“A legal positivist approach . . . helps to overcome many of the philosophical
differences that would otherwise undermine the usefulness of a human rights methodology in the
trade law context.”).
93. See JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS & THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE
75–76 (1984) (providing evidence that the UDHR “is now part of the customary law of nations”);
Richard Pierre Claude, Scientists’ Rights and the Human Right to the Benefits of Science, in CORE
OBLIGATIONS, supra note 68, at 247, 252 (“[A]fter fifty years, the Universal Declaration . . . has
begun to take on the qualities of ‘customary international law.’”); Torremans, supra note 26, at 201
(“[W]here initially Member States were not obliged to implement [the Declaration] on the basis
[that it is merely aspirational or advisory in nature], it has now gradually acquired the status of
customary international law and of the single most authoritative source of human rights norms.”).
See generally THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW
(1989) (examining human rights and humanitarian law in relation to the general principles of
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international and regional human rights instruments, has undeniably
achieved an international normative consensus.94
Third, based on the usual approach to drafting international
agreements, the provisions in international human rights instruments “do
not necessarily have a commonly agreed-upon purpose (other than a broad
one to promote human dignity and respect).”95 As Professor James Nickel
points out, “[P]eople can agree on human rights without agreeing on the
grounds of human rights.”96 During treaty drafting processes, delegates
often harbor disparate concerns and vote based on different motivations. In
the context of Article 27 of the UDHR, these motivations “ranged from the
protection of moral rights to international harmonization to collateral
realization of other human rights.”97 In retrospect, no one can pinpoint
exactly what motivated the delegates to adopt a particular provision.
Indeed, international instruments cannot escape the realpolitik of
international negotiations no matter how much foresight the drafters had.
As one commentator observes:
[H]uman rights codifications inevitably convey a somewhat
incomplete, or even biased, image of what human rights really
are. All of them have been drafted and enacted under specific
political and economic circumstances, and therefore reflect
the mindsets and specific concerns of their drafters and the
time they lived in. They are often the fruit of political
compromise—a constraint to which moral truth is not
exposed.98
According to Professor Donnelly, human rights are far from “timeless,
unchanging, or absolute; any list or conception of human rights—and the
idea of human rights itself—is historically specific and contingent.”99
C. Human Rights for Corporate Owners?
The final challenge concerns the increasing willingness of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to extend human rights
protection to non-individuals, such as corporate owners of intellectual
international law).
94. See DONNELLY, supra note 63, at 17 (“[T]here is a remarkable international normative
consensus on the list of rights contained in the Universal Declaration and the International Human
Rights Covenants . . . .”); id. at 40–41 (discussing the concept of “overlapping consensus on
international human rights”).
95. Yu, supra note 11, at 1072.
96. JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 177 (2d ed. 2007).
97. See Yu, supra note 11, at 1072–73.
98. Jakob Cornides, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Convergence?, 7 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 135, 137 (2004).
99. DONNELLY, supra note 63, at 1.
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property rights. As Professors Helfer and Austin observe:
Some in the human rights community . . . fear that intellectual
property owners—in particular, multinational corporations—
will invoke the creators’ rights and property rights provisions
of international instruments to lock in maximalist intellectual
property rules that will further concentrate wealth in the hands
of a few at the expense of the many.100
In Anheuser-Busch, Inc v. Portugal,101 for example, the Grand
Chamber of the ECtHR extended the coverage of Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 to the European Convention of Human Rights102 to both registered
trademarks and trademark applications of a multinational corporation. The
case concerned a dispute over Portugal’s cancellation of a multinational
brewery’s application for the “Budweiser” trademark in an effort to protect
the appellation of origin “Budějovický Budvar,” which is owned by
Budweiser’s longstanding Czech rival.103 Focusing on the right to property,
the ECtHR considered the term “possessions” to include trademarks and
trademark applications.104 Following this decision, even a faceless
corporation may receive human rights-like protection for its intellectual
property.
The willingness of the ECtHR to extend human rights protection to the
intellectual property of corporate entities is particularly important to our
analysis of the human rights implications of TRIPS-plus nonmultilateral
agreements. To be certain, one could make a strong argument that
corporations aggregate the disparate human rights interests of individuals,
such as their individual shareholders. One could also cite to the many
social benefits created through lawsuits brought by resourceful corporate
entities on behalf of individuals whose rights have been violated.105
Nevertheless, given the considerable disparity in power between
transnational corporations and individuals (or even governments
representing some of these individuals106), the tension created by a system
that allows corporate owners to demand greater human rights protection at
100. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 504–05.
101. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 36 (2007) (Grand Chamber).
102. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
103. See Torremans, supra note 26, at 205; Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier?
Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (2008).
104. See Helfer, supra note 103, at 7–8.
105. See Yu, supra note 39, at 728–29.
106. See HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND
ACCESS TO MEDICINES 94–95 (2007) (“Corporate power has grown to rival that of states: in 2002
the corporation with the largest sales figure, Wal-Mart at $217,799m, outdid Austria’s 2002 GDP,
the twentieth biggest national GDP of the world, and was not that much smaller than the GDP of all
of Sub-Saharan Africa ($319,288m).” (footnote omitted)).
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the expense of individuals is inherently troubling.
As a conceptual matter, such an expansive view of human rights is also
highly problematic. As the CESCR reminds us:
[O]nly the “author”, namely the creator, whether man or
woman, individual or group of individuals, of scientific,
literary or artistic productions, such as, inter alia, writers and
artists, can be the beneficiary of the protection of article 15,
paragraph 1(c). . . . Under the existing international treaty
protection regimes, legal entities are included among the
holders of intellectual property rights. However, . . . their
entitlements, because of their different nature, are not
protected at the level of human rights.107
Likewise, Professor Donnelly declares emphatically, “Collectivities of all
sorts have many and varied rights. But these are not—cannot be—human
rights, unless we substantially recast the concept.”108 It is one thing to give
corporations standing to bring human rights claims on behalf of
individuals, but quite another to allow corporate owners to claim that “their
‘human’ rights have [actually] been violated.”109 This Article therefore
focuses only on individuals; it does not explore the impact of
nonmultilateral agreements on the human rights-like protection afforded to
corporate owners that the ECtHR has recently recognized.
Moreover, if corporate owners have rights, they should also have
human rights responsibilities.110 The lack of such responsibilities is,
107. General Comment No. 17, supra note 27, ¶ 7 (footnote omitted).
108. DONNELLY, supra note 63, at 25.
109. Yu, supra note 39, at 730. As I noted in an earlier article:
I consider it acceptable and socially beneficial for a newspaper to bring a human
rights lawsuit on behalf of its individual readers, whose rights have been violated
and who may not be able to afford the lawsuit—in terms of either time, energy or
resources. However, it would be disturbing for that newspaper to claim that its
human rights have been violated.
Id. at 730 n.72 (emphasis omitted).
110. See General Comment No. 17, supra note 27, ¶ 55 (“While only States parties to the
Covenant are held accountable for compliance with its provisions, they are nevertheless urged to
consider regulating the responsibility resting on the private business sector, private research
institutions and other non-State actors to respect the rights recognized in article 15, paragraph 1(c),
of the Covenant.”); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & Prot. of Human
Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26,
2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.
Rev.2.En?Opendocument [hereinafter Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations] (“Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations
and other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect,
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indeed, the reason why we need to better balance the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights against international human
rights commitments. In recent years, international human rights bodies
have increasingly outlined the vast responsibilities of corporate owners in
areas implicated by intellectual property protection and enforcement.111
For example, in its authoritative interpretative comment on the right to
health, the CESCR declares: “While only States are parties to the
[ICESCR] and thus ultimately accountable for compliance with it, all
members of society— . . . including . . . the private business sector—have
responsibilities regarding the realization of the right to health.”112 The
preamble to the Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies
in Relation to Access to Medicines similarly states: “Pharmaceutical
companies, including innovator, generic and biotechnology companies,
have human rights responsibilities in relation to access to medicines.”113
Guideline 26, in particular, stipulates that these companies “should make
ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law,
including the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups.”); see also
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion & Prot. of the Right to Freedom of Opinion & Expression,
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, ¶ 45, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011)
(by Frank La Rue), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session
/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression]
(“While States are the duty-bearers for human rights, private actors and business enterprises also
have a responsibility to respect human rights.”); Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical & Mental Health, Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of
Physical and Mental Health, at 6–12, transmitted by Note of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc.
A/63/263 (Aug. 11, 2008) (by Paul Hunt), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/G
EN/N08/456/47/PDF/N0845647.pdf? OpenElement [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur
on Health] (discussing the “human rights responsibilities of pharmaceutical companies in relation to
access to medicines”).
111. See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on Health, supra note 110, at 15–25; Norms
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations, supra note 110; ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 7–25 (2008), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf; Overview of the UN Global Compact, U.N.
GLOBAL COMPACT (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.globalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/ (providing
information about the U.N. Global Compact, which aims at aligning business initiatives “with [the]
ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anticorruption”). For discussions of the relationship between human rights obligations and private
actors, see generally ALISON BRYSK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRIVATE WRONGS: CONSTRUCTING GLOBAL
CIVIL SOCIETY 117 (2005) ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE (1993);
Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE
L.J. 443, 475–88 (2001).
112. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11,
2000).
113. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Health, supra note 111, at 15.
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and respect a public commitment not to lobby for more demanding
protection of intellectual property interests than those required by TRIPS,
such as additional limitations on compulsory licensing.”114
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Compatibilities and Synergies
Although commentators remain concerned about the adverse impact of
intellectual property rights on the human rights system, the protection and
enforcement of those rights can be consistent with a country’s human
rights commitments. In fact, because some attributes of intellectual
property rights are protected by international or regional human rights
instruments, greater protection of those attributes can promote the
protection of human rights.
The intellectual property provisions in nonmultilateral agreements
cover a wide variety of intellectual property rights, ranging from copyrights
to patents and from geographical indications to sui generis database
protection.115 Although an ongoing debate exists concerning whether
international human rights instruments recognize the right to property116
and whether intellectual property should be identified as personal
property,117 many commentators have equated the protection of intellectual
property rights with the protection of human rights.
In Europe, this view is strongly supported by the ECtHR’s
interpretation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention of
Human Rights.118 Intellectual property is also explicitly covered in the
right to property provision in Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union,119 which recently entered into force
114. Id. at 21.
115. See, e.g., ACTA, supra note 1, art. 5(h); Economic Partnership Agreement Between the
CARIFORUM States, of the One Part, and the European Community and Its Member States, of the
Other Part art. 139(3), Oct. 30, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 289/I) 3 [hereinafter EC-CARIFORUM EPA],
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/february/tradoc_137971.pdf.
116. See General Comment No. 17, supra note 27, ¶ 15 (“The protection of ‘material interests’
of authors in article 15, paragraph 1(c), reflects the close linkage of this provision with the right to
own property, as recognized in article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in
regional human rights instruments, as well as with the right of any worker to adequate remuneration
(art. 7(a)).”); see also Yu, supra note 39, at 731–36 (exploring whether “the right to private
property already provides adequate protection to the interests in intellectual creations”).
117. See Raustiala, supra note 35, at 1032 (warning that “the embrace of [intellectual property]
by human rights advocates and entities . . . is likely to further entrench some dangerous ideas about
property: in particular, that property rights as human rights ought to be inviolable and ought to
receive extremely solicitous attention from the international community”).
118. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 36, ¶ 78 (2007) (holding that
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable to intellectual property as well as the application for
intellectual property rights if such an application gives rise to proprietary interests).
119. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 17(2), Dec. 7, 2000, 2000
O.J. (C 364) 1 (“Intellectual property shall be protected.”).
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following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.120
Even for those refusing to equate intellectual property rights with
human rights, the intellectual property provisions do protect important
human rights attributes of intellectual property rights. To begin with, some
of these provisions protect the material interests in the creations of
individual authors and inventors as recognized in international human
rights instruments.121 While not all forms of intellectual property rights
should be protected at the level of human rights, copyrights and patents
clearly implicate the material interests of individual authors and
inventors.122
The intellectual property provisions in nonmultilateral agreements also
offer important protection to the moral interests in the creations of
individual authors and inventors.123 For instance, the provisions on
copyright and related rights help strengthen the protection of moral rights;
they ensure proper identification and attribution of the creative work and
prevent the work from being recoded or otherwise modified in a manner
that would prejudice the author’s honor or reputation.124 The provisions on
copyright management information and the requirement that the parties
ratify the 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties125 also serve similar purposes.126 In
addition, the provisions on patents help ensure the recognition of
individual inventors, whose contributions patent grants will
acknowledge.127
Likewise, the provisions on geographical indications can help
120. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1. The Charter of Fundamental Rights
became effective on December 1, 2009. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL
FOR
JUSTICE
(Nov.
11,
2011),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm.
121. See UDHR, supra note 32, art. 27(2); ICESCR, supra note 28, art. 15(1)(c).
122. See Yu, supra note 11, at 1083–92 (discussing the protection of material interests in
intellectual creations).
123. See General Comment No. 17, supra note 27, ¶ 2 (“[T]he human right to benefit from the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from one’s scientific, literary and artistic
productions safeguards the personal link between authors and their creations and between peoples,
communities, or other groups and their collective cultural heritage, as well as their basic material
interests which are necessary to enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living.”).
124. See, e.g., EC-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 115, art. 143.
125. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17 (1997); WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, at 18 (1997).
126. See, e.g., ACTA, supra note 1, arts. 27(5)–(8); Dominican Republic–Central America–
United States Free Trade Agreement art. 15.1(2), Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/
trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text
[hereinafter CAFTA-DR]; EC-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 115, art. 143(A)(1).
127. See, e.g., CAFTA-DR, supra note 126, art. 15.9; EC-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note
115, art. 147; see also Paris Convention, supra note 17, art. 4ter (stipulating that “the inventor shall
have the right to be mentioned as such in the patent”).
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indigenous peoples and traditional communities obtain the much-needed
protection of the moral and material interests in their creations.128 The
provisions on the protection of traditional knowledge and cultural
expressions can also preserve the ways of life and economic and cultural
heritage of these individuals and communities.129 By fostering the
equitable sharing of benefits, these provisions thereby promote the right to
self-determination, the right to development, the right to cultural
participation and development, and the right to the benefits of scientific
progress of these individuals and communities. As far as biodiversity,
seeds, plant genetic resources, and traditional agrarian practices are
concerned, such protection could implicate the rights to adequate food and
health.
From the human rights standpoint, the protection of traditional
knowledge and cultural expressions is rather important. As stated in the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which the United Nations
General Assembly adopted in September 2007:
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect
and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and
traditional cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations
of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human
and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the
properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures,
designs, sports and traditional games and visual and
performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control,
protect and develop their intellectual property over such
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional
cultural expressions.130

128. See, e.g., CAFTA-DR, supra note 126, art. 15.3; EC-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note
115, art. 145; see also Dev Gangjee, Geographical Indications and Human Rights, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 383 (discussing geographical
indications in relation to the protection of human rights). Nevertheless, the protection of
geographical indications could also undermine the protection of human rights if the former creates a
trade barrier by imposing unfair restrictions on the ability of local producers to rename, label,
remarket, or brand their products. See SISULE F. MUSUNGU, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE EC-CARIFORUM EPA: LESSONS FOR OTHER ACP REGIONS 31 (2009),
http://www.iqsensato.org/pdf/iqsensato-studies-no-1-full.pdf.
129. See, e.g., EC-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 115, art. 150; see also HELFER & AUSTIN,
supra note 12, at 3 (“Some indigenous communities invoke intellectual property rights as vehicles
for preserving their ways of life and protecting their cultural and economic heritage . . . .”); Peter K.
Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 433, 471–73
(2008) (discussing preservation and conservation as the main objectives of the protection for
cultural heritage).
130. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, art.
31(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) (emphasis added).
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Although the Declaration does not cover intellectual property rights per se,
the protection of indigenous heritage is likely to have serious ramifications
for the protection of intellectual property rights. The Declaration’s focus on
the protection of “cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional
cultural expressions”131 also echoes provisions in the UDHR, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the ICESCR, and
other international and regional human rights instruments.132
Moreover, nonmultilateral agreements may include abuse of rights
provisions to promote competition,133 which complement other provisions
related to antitrust or competition law.134 They may also include
technology transfer provisions,135 which could promote the protection of
human rights, in particular the right to the benefits of scientific progress.
The scope and extent of such protection, however, will depend on how
serious signatory countries take those obligations. For example, Articles
66.2 and 67 of the TRIPS Agreement outline the obligations of developed
countries to promote technology transfer, technical cooperation, and legal
assistance in developing and least developed countries.136 Even though the
Doha Ministerial Decision of November 14, 2001, reaffirmed the
131. Id.
132. See UDHR, supra note 32, art. 27(2) (declaring that “everyone has the right freely to
participate in the cultural life of the community”); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 27, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 19, 1966) (recognizing right of minorities “to enjoy their
own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language”); ICESCR,
supra note 28, art. 15(1)(a) (recognizing right “[t]o take part in cultural life”); Int’l Labour Org.,
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries [No. 169] art.
15(2), June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M 1382 (“In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral
or sub-surface resources or rights to other resources pertaining to lands, governments shall establish
or maintain procedures through which they shall consult these peoples, with a view to ascertaining
whether and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting
any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands. The
peoples concerned shall wherever possible participate in the benefits of such activities, and shall
receive fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of such activities.”).
133. See, e.g., ACTA, supra note 1, art. 27(3); CAFTA-DR, supra note 126, art. 15.1(15); ECCARIFORUM EPA, supra note 115, arts. 97, 111, 128(3), 142(2), 151(2).
134. See High Commissioner’s Report, supra note 25, ¶ 64 (encouraging “States to consider
the elaboration of competition laws that prevent abuses of IPRs that lead to violations of the right to
health—in particular restrictive licensing practices or the setting of high prices for essential drugs”).
135. See, e.g., EC-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 115, art. 142.
136. See TRIPS Agreement art. 66.2 (“Developed country Members shall provide incentives to
enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging
technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create a sound
and viable technological base.”); id. art. 67 (“In order to facilitate the implementation of this
Agreement, developed country Members shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms
and conditions, technical and financial cooperation in favour of developing and least-developed
country Members. Such cooperation shall include assistance in the preparation of laws and
regulations on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as on the
prevention of their abuse, and shall include support regarding the establishment or reinforcement of
domestic offices and agencies relevant to these matters, including the training of personnel.”).
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mandatory nature of these obligations,137 developed countries thus far have
failed to take them seriously.
Finally, if trademark protection in nonmultilateral agreements could be
extended to cover personality interests, such as those protections found
under the right of publicity in the United States or personality rights in
other jurisdictions,138 nonmultilateral agreements could provide important
protection to individuals—especially celebrities—against the unauthorized
use of their names, likenesses, images, voices, or other personal attributes.
Such protection may also enhance the protection against privacy intrusions,
which goes hand in hand with publicity rights.139 Although the right to
privacy is generally not within the scope of intellectual property rights,140
some nonmultilateral agreements, especially those involving the European
Union, do contain provisions to ensure proper protection of personal data
and informational privacy.141

137. See World Trade Organization, Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns: Decision of
14 November 2001, ¶ 11.2, WT/MIN(01)/17, 41 I.L.M. 757 (2002) (“[T]he provisions of Article
66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement are mandatory.”).
138. See generally Catherine W. Ng, Some Cultural Narrative Themes and Variations in the
Common Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 359, 366–70
(discussing protection against appropriation of personality in common law jurisdictions); Peter K.
Yu, No Personality Rights for Pop Stars in Hong Kong?, in THE LAW OF REPUTATION AND BRANDS
IN THE ASIA PACIFIC RIM (Andrew Kenyon et al. eds., forthcoming 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1672311 [hereinafter Yu, No Personality Rights] (discussing the limited
protection of personality rights in Hong Kong); Hayley Stallard, The Right of Publicity in the
United Kingdom, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 565 (1998) (discussing the restricted protection of
personality rights in the United Kingdom); Peter K. Yu, Note, Fictional Persona Test: Copyright
Preemption in Human Audiovisual Characters, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 355, 359–67 (1998)
(providing an overview of the right of publicity in the United States).
139. See Rosina Zapparoni, Propertising Identity: Understanding the United States Right of
Publicity and Its Implications—Some Lessons for Australia, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 690, 706 (2004)
(noting “the unique historic relationship of the right of publicity to privacy law in the US” and
stating that “the right of publicity is, and continues to be, closely aligned with a branch of privacy
law based on misappropriation”); Yu, No Personality Rights, supra note 138 (stating that “the
protections of privacy and personality rights can reinforce each other beneficially”). But see Peter
Jaffey, Privacy, Confidentiality and Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 25, at 447, 464–65 (“The right to prevent the commercial use of one’s public image does
not relate to private information; indeed the commercial use of a public image does not involve the
transmission of information at all (unless it is understood as an endorsement). That is not to say that
such a right is not justified. But it has to be justified on quite different grounds from a right against
the invasion of informational privacy.”).
140. See, e.g., ACTA, supra note 1, art. 5(h); EC-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 115, art.
139(3); see also Yu, No Personality Rights, supra note 138 (explaining why no need exists for
international harmonization in the area of personality or publicity rights).
141. See, e.g., ACTA, supra note 1, art. 4; CAFTA-DR, supra note 126, art. 15.4(2); ECCARIFORUM EPA, supra note 115, arts. 10, 107, 155(3)(e), 197–201.
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B. Conflicts, Inconsistencies, and Lost Opportunities
Although intellectual property provisions in nonmultilateral agreements
can promote the protection of human rights, they can also frustrate such
protection. Indeed, many commentators believe that these provisions
would frustrate such protection more than they promote it. The human
rights impediments created by TRIPS-plus nonmultilateral agreements can
arise in two different ways: first, directly through the tension created by the
language of the intellectual property provisions in nonmultilateral
agreements; and second, indirectly through an emphasis on trade,
economic partnerships, and nonmultilateral approaches that eventually
divert time, resources, energy, and attention from the further development
of the international human rights system. This Section discusses direct
impediments, and the next Section examines indirect impediments.
At the normative level, direct human rights impediments can take the
form of conflicts or inconsistencies between TRIPS-plus nonmultilateral
agreements and international human rights instruments. They can also take
the form of lost opportunities resulting from the failure of nonmultilateral
agreements to promote the protection of human rights, even though such
protection would not create any direct conflict with the intellectual
property provisions in the agreements.142 These lost opportunities were due
in large part to the misguided and unproven assumption that more
intellectual property rights are always better.143 At times, developed
countries and their policy makers seek to strengthen the levels of protection
and enforcement of intellectual property rights at all costs, without taking
full account of the many spillover effects in the human rights arena.
To help us better understand the potential conflicts, inconsistencies,
and lost opportunities, this Section focuses on three debates in areas where
intellectual property rights have posed significant challenges to the
protection of human rights. However, it does not identify each individual
intellectual property provision in light of the large number of interrelated
provisions involved and the wide variety of human rights implicated in the
debates.
1. Access to Essential Medicines
The most widely cited debate concerns the much-needed access to
essential medicines in less developed countries,144 which was impeded by
142. See MUSUNGU, supra note 128, at 35.
143. See James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property, 2004
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0009, at 2–3 (2004), http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/
2004DLTR0009.pdf (discussing the “maximalist ‘rights culture’” and the resulting loss of balance
in the intellectual property system).
144. For discussions of TRIPS developments in relation to access to medicines, see generally
NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES (Pedro Roffe et al. eds.,
2006); Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the
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the strong protection of patents and clinical trial data, as well as heightened
measures restricting parallel imports while mandating the seizure of intransit generic drugs.145 This debate has caught the attention of the WTO,
WIPO, WHO, and other international intergovernmental bodies.146
The debate concerning access to essential medicines implicates both
the right to life and the right to health. Article 3 of the UDHR explicitly
provides: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.”147
Article 25(1) further recognizes that every person has “the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself [or
herself] and of his [or her] family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care and necessary social services.”148 Echoing this provision, the
preamble to the WHO Constitution declares: “The enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of
every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief,
economic or social condition.”149 While the right to life has arguably
entered into customary international law, a raging debate continues over
the legal status of the right to health.150
Regardless of the legal status of the right to health, the AIDS crises in
less developed countries have led many policy makers, commentators, and
activists to question the expediency and appropriateness of the existing

Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 317 (2005); Peter K. Yu, The International
Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827 (2007).
145. See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit Based
on Allegations of Patent Infringement: A Threat to International Trade, Development and Public
Welfare, 1 WIPO J. 43 (2009) (discussing issues concerning the seizure of in-transit generic drugs
in Europe); Kaitlin Mara, Drug Seizures in Frankfurt Spark Fears of EU-Wide Pattern, INTELL.
PROP. WATCH (June 5, 2009), http://www.ip-watch.org/2009/06/05/drug-seizures-in-frankfurtspark-fears-of-eu-wide-pattern/ (reporting about the seizure of generic drugs in Europe). In May
2010, Brazil and India filed complaints against the European Union and the Netherlands over the
repeated seizure of in-transit generic drugs. See Request for Consultations by India, European
Union and a Member State—Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010);
Request for Consultations by Brazil, European Union and a Member State—Seizure of Generic
Drugs in Transit, WT/DS409/1 (May 19, 2010). A year later, India and the European Union
reached an interim settlement. India, EU Ink Deal to End Drug Seizure for Now, TIMES OF INDIA
(July 29, 2011), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-07-29/india-business/29828750_
1_generic-drugs-consignments-of-generic-medicines-eu-parliament. It remains to be seen whether
India will withdraw its complaint from the WTO and whether Brazil will follow suit.
146. See Yu, supra note 75, at 527–29.
147. UDHR, supra note 32, art. 3.
148. Id. art. 25(1).
149. Constitution of the World Health Organization pmbl., recital 2, July 22, 1946, 62 Stat.
2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185.
150. See, e.g., HESTERMEYER, supra note 106, at 76–136 (discussing access to medicines as a
human right); Denis Borges Barbosa et al., Slouching Towards Development in International
Intellectual Property, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 71, 131–33 (discussing the legal status of the right to
health in relation to the Doha Declaration and the access to medicines debate).
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intellectual property system.151 Indeed, concerns over these crises led WTO
members to adopt the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health,152 which “recognize[d] the gravity of the public health
problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries,
especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other
epidemics.”153 The document also declared that “the TRIPS Agreement
does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect
public health” and that “the Agreement can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect
public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”154
A few years later, the member states adopted a pioneering protocol to
formally amend the TRIPS Agreement by adding Article 31bis.155 If
ratified by two-thirds of the WTO membership, the proposed amendment
will allow countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity to
import generic versions of patented pharmaceuticals. As of this writing,
more than a third of the 153 WTO member states, including the United
States, India, Japan, China, and members of the European Union, have
ratified the proposed amendment.156
Interestingly, some commentators have suggested that the right to
health can go in the opposite direction. For example, victims of harmful
diseases can use this right to argue for the need to provide incentives for
pharmaceutical manufacturers to develop drugs that treat, prevent, or cure
the diseases.157 Although the intellectual property system provides the
much-needed incentives for the development of new pharmaceuticals,158
commentators continue to disagree over whether some of these incentives
can be generated outside the intellectual property system or through other
151. See generally THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF HIV/AIDS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES (Obijiofor Aginam, John Harrington & Peter K. Yu eds.,
forthcoming 2012) (examining the global HIV/AIDS governance regime and the implications of
high international intellectual property standards for access to essential medicines in developing
countries).
152. See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2001).
153. Id. ¶ 1.
154. Id. ¶ 4.
155. See General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, at 2, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8,
2005); see also Yu, supra note 144, at 872–86 (discussing the proposed Article 31bis of the TRIPS
Agreement and its origins).
156. See Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last updated Oct. 5, 2012).
157. See, e.g., Martin J. Adelman, Theodore and James Pedas Family Professor of Intellectual
Prop. & Tech. Law, The George Washington Univ. Law Sch., Remarks at the 15th Fordham Annual
International Intellectual Property and Policy Conference (Apr. 13, 2007).
158. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 106–09 (2008); DAN L. BURK & MARK A.
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 49 (2009).
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funding models, such as grants, subsidies, prizes, advance market
commitments, reputation gains, open source drug discovery, patent pools,
public–private partnerships, or equity-based systems built upon liability
rules.159 Such disagreement is understandable, considering that the
international human rights instruments have not specified a modality of
protection for interests in intellectual creations.160
There is also an ongoing debate concerning the optimal levels of patent
protection for less developed countries and whether existing protections
have already exceeded those levels. As Professor Josh Lerner observes:
“Almost all economists would agree that some intellectual property
protection is better than no intellectual property protection at all. But this
does not mean that very strong protection is better than a more moderate
level of protection.”161 Noting the problems in the patent systems in many
developed countries, Professors Keith Maskus and Jerome Reichman have
also called for “[a] moratorium on stronger international intellectual
property standards.”162
159. See, e.g., INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH: PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 133–283 (Thomas Pogge et al. eds., 2010) (collecting articles discussing
prizes, patent pools, and open source drug discovery); GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE
LICENSING MODELS: PATENT POOLS, CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY
REGIMES (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2009) (collecting articles discussing patent pools,
clearinghouses, open source models, and liability regimes); Yu, supra note 11, at 1088–92
(discussing the different acceptable modalities of protection that can be used to realize the right to
the protection of interests in intellectual creations).
160. See General Comment No. 17, supra note 27, ¶ 10 (“[T]he protection under article 15,
paragraph 1(c), need not necessarily reflect the level and means of protection found in present
copyright, patent and other intellectual property regimes, as long as the protection available is
suited to secure for authors the moral and material interests resulting from their productions . . . .”);
Yu, supra note 11, at 1089 (“[T]he key criterion for satisfying the material interests obligation is
not whether the offered protection meets the level of protection required by existing international
intellectual property agreements or whether such protection is based on the property rights model.
Rather, one has to inquire whether the existing system provides meaningful protection of material
interests in the creations by authors and inventors.”).
161. Josh Lerner, The Patent System in a Time of Turmoil, 2 WIPO J. 28, 32 (2010).
162. See Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge
Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 36 (Keith E.
Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005). As they explain:
[T]he drive to further harmonize the international minimum standards of patent
protection at WIPO has occurred at the very time when the domestic standards of
the United States and the operations of its patent system are under critical
assault. . . . How, under such circumstances, could it be timely to harmonize and
elevate international standards of patent protection—even if that were
demonstrably beneficial—when there is so little agreement in the U.S. itself on
how to rectify a dysfunctional apparatus that often seems out of
control? . . . Further harmonization efforts in this climate thus amount to a gamble
from which bad decisions and bad laws are far more likely to emerge than good

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/6

34

Yu and Yu: Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era

2012]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

1079

2. Access to Knowledge
A second debate concerns access to information technology,
communications infrastructure, computer software, electronic databases,
and digital content. Such access is impeded by the protection of copyrights,
databases, and technological measures. This debate implicates the rights to
education and freedom of expression. Because education directly affects
one’s ability to fully realize oneself,163 the impeded access has troubled
those adopting the human capabilities or human flourishing approaches to
human rights.164 The issue regarding access to knowledge further ties the
discussion on intellectual property and human rights to both the older
debate about the global digital divide165 and a much newer one concerning
access to knowledge.166
Thanks to the Internet and new communications technologies, the
debate on access to information technology has now caught the attention of
not only civil liberties groups, but also the United Nations and other
international intergovernmental organizations. Held in two phases in
Geneva and Tunis,167 the World Summit on the Information Society sought
to address the concerns raised by the growing digital divide in less
developed countries and the possibility that these countries might lose out
laws that appropriately balance public and private interests.
Id. at 24–26 (footnote omitted).
163. See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 322 (discussing the connection between
education and the idea of self-realization); Fons Coomans, In Search of the Core Content of the
Right to Education, in CORE OBLIGATIONS, supra note 68, at 217, 219 (characterizing the right to
education as an “‘empowerment’ right”).
164. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2821, 2885 (2006) (proposing to integrate a principle of substantive equality “throughout
intellectual property globalization decision-making via a legal rule akin to the strict scrutiny
doctrine in U.S. constitutional law”); Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 287–88 (1997) (providing an open-ended working list of the most central
human capabilities). See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011) (providing a detailed overview of the human capabilities approach
to development); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH (2000) (discussing the human capabilities approach to human rights in relation to
women in less developed countries); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 87–110 (1999)
(outlining the human flourishing approach to development).
165. See generally Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age,
20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2002) (discussing the global digital divide).
166. For discussions of the access to knowledge debate, see generally ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE
IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010); Amy
Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property,
117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008).
167. See Yu, supra note 75, at 537–38 (discussing the World Summit on the Information
Society and developments in the emerging information and communications regime); see also
World Summit on the Information Society, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.
html (last updated Nov. 17, 2011) (providing information about the World Summit).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 6

1080

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

on many unprecedented opportunities generated by the information
revolution.168 This summit led to the launch of the Internet Governance
Forum (IGF), which was created to promote a “multilateral, multistakeholder, democratic and transparent” policy dialogue on Internet
governance.169 IGF meetings have since convened in Athens, Rio de
Janeiro, Hyderabad, Sharm El Sheikh, Vilnius, and Nairobi.170
In recent years, the adoption of the graduated response system171 has
elicited strong criticisms in the human rights arena.172 Of primary concern
are the human rights implications of Internet disconnection, the system’s
final option. From the human rights standpoint, using suspension or
termination of Internet service as a remedy for alleged copyright
infringement is highly problematic. As Frank La Rue, the Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, declared in his recent report:
The Special Rapporteur considers cutting off users from
Internet access, regardless of the justification provided,
including on the grounds of violating intellectual property
rights law, to be disproportionate and thus a violation of
Article 19, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
The Special Rapporteur [further] calls upon all States to
ensure that Internet access is maintained at all times,
including during times of political unrest. In particular, the
Special Rapporteur urges States to repeal or amend existing
intellectual copyright laws which permit users to be
disconnected from Internet access, and to refrain from
adopting such laws.173
The Special Rapporteur’s concern and request are understandable.
After all, repressive governments have recruited Internet service providers
to serve as gatekeepers to help censor digital content and restrict
168. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Trust and Distrust of Intellectual Property Rights, 18
REVUE QUÉBÉCOISE DE DROIT INT’L 107 (2005) (discussing intellectual property issues raised at the
World Summit on the Information Society in Geneva).
169. Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU], World Summit on the Info. Soc’y, Tunis Agenda for the
Information Society, ¶¶ 72–73, WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E (Nov. 18, 2005), available at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html.
170. See INTERNET GOVERNANCE F., http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/ (last visited Feb. 2,
2012) (providing information about the Internet Governance Forum); see also Molly Beutz Land,
Protecting Rights Online, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 32–38 (2009) (discussing the Internet Governance
Forum in the context of human rights and access to knowledge).
171. See supra Part I.
172. See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, supra note 110,
¶¶ 78–79.
173. Id. ¶¶ 78–79.
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information flows.174 While the graduated response system protects
intellectual property rights holders, as opposed to governments, its impact
on individual freedom of expression is not that different from the impact of
government censorship.175
Indeed, as I have pointed out elsewhere, developed countries’
increasing push for draconian measures to respond to enforcement
problems in the digital environment has slowly backfired on their
longstanding interests in promoting free speech, free press, human rights,
and civil liberties abroad.176 From the human rights standpoint, provisions
174. See Yu, supra note 46, at 715 (noting the free speech concerns raised by the proposal in
Hong Kong’s digital copyright reform to introduce a streamlined procedure to obtain users’
information for the facilitation of copyright infringement actions); Yu, supra note 59, at 1402
(discussing how the graduated response system would undermine the protection of free speech, free
press, and privacy). See generally Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment,
Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11 (2006)
(discussing how private actors have been enlisted as “proxy censors” to control the flow of
information).
It is worth noting that the use of Internet service providers as gatekeepers to help censor digital
content and restrict information flows is not limited to repressive governments. Many democracies
in the developed world engage in such use. See Rebecca MacKinnon, The Green Dam
Phenomenon, WALL ST. J. ASIA, June 18, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12452599205102
3961.html (“The Internet censorship club is expanding and now includes a growing number of
democracies. Legislators are under growing pressure from family groups to ‘do something’ in the
face of all the threats sloshing around the Internet, and the risk of overstepping is high.”); see also
REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET
FREEDOM 101 (2012) (“[P]oliticians throughout the democratic world are pushing for stronger
censorship and surveillance by Internet companies to stop the theft of intellectual property. They are
doing so in response to aggressive lobbying by powerful corporate constituents without adequate
consideration of the consequences for civil liberties, and for democracy more broadly.”);
Christopher Rhoads & Loretta Chao, Iran’s Web Spying Aided by Western Technology, WALL ST.
J., June 22, 2009, at A1 (discussing Internet control in Britain, Germany, United States, and
Australia); Transparency Report, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/government
requests/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2012) (providing the Google transparency report).
175. See Yu, supra note 59, at 1374 (noting that the graduated response system involves
mostly private censorship, as opposed to state censorship).
176. As I have noted before:
Today, the entertainment industry’s aggressive push for stronger copyright
protection and enforcement has caused serious collateral damages to society at
large, eroding the protections of free speech, free press, privacy, due process, and
other civil liberties. The proposed ACTA, for example, calls for draconian
measures that threaten to undermine the United States’ longstanding interests in
promoting human rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law abroad. Likewise, the
push for the worldwide adoption of the graduated response system has undermined
the protections of free speech, free press, privacy, and both procedural and
substantive due process. In addition, the introduction of anti-circumvention laws
and the ongoing push for greater protection of digital rights management tools
have brought about many unintended consequences, chilling innovation and
competition while raising concerns over free speech, privacy, consumer
protection, academic freedom, learning, scientific advancement, cultural
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that call for Internet disconnection, greater intermediary liability for
Internet service providers, and tougher criminal penalties for unauthorized
dissemination of online content have raised very serious concerns.177
3. Global Climate Change
The final debate concerns the role of the intellectual property system in
response to challenges posed by global climate change.178 As the debate
has emerged only recently, it is unclear what rights will be implicated,
what limitations and exceptions will be introduced, and how and whether
the overall intellectual property system will be changed. Indeed, the rights
involved are more likely to be covered in the category of lost opportunities
than in the category of conflicts or inconsistencies.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the debate will implicate such
important human rights as the rights to health, adequate housing, adequate
food, water, and development.179 Because of the asymmetry in resource
endowment, less developed countries with significant populations and
resources in areas vulnerable to floods, hurricanes, typhoons, tsunamis,
severe drought, desertification, or forest decay will likely suffer more than
others if the intellectual property system is not better managed to respond
to climate change.

development, and democratic discourse.
Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 881, 928–
29 (2011) (footnotes omitted); see also Robert S. Rogoyski & Kenneth Basin, The Bloody Case that
Started from a Parody: American Intellectual Property and the Pursuit of Democratic Ideals in
Modern China, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 237, 254–59 (2009) (discussing the damage to free speech
wrought by overreaching copyright protection); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting
Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 174 (2000) (“By
demonstrating that a country should rely heavily on pressure and ultimata to protect its economic
interests, the existing foreign intellectual property policy backfires and jeopardizes the United
States’s longstanding interests in promoting human rights and civil liberties in China. It also
discredits the very important message that one should respect rights and the legal process.”).
177. For critiques of these provisions, see generally Yu, supra note 46, at 701–16 (examining
provisions creating criminal liability for the unauthorized distribution of copyrighted works and
concerning Internet service providers); Yu, supra note 59, at 1390–1403 (discussing the drawbacks
of the graduated response system).
178. For discussions of the relationship between intellectual property rights and global climate
change, see generally ERIC L. LANE, CLEAN TECH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011); MATTHEW
RIMMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE (2011); RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE (Joshua Sarnoff ed., forthcoming 2012).
179. See MARCOS A. ORELLANA ET AL., TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE UNFCCC AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIMES: THE CHALLENGE OF SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION 4 (2010), available at
http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/181/138_technology_transfer_UNFCCC.pdf.
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C. Systemic Tension and Indirect Impediments
In addition to the above conflicts and inconsistencies, the intellectual
property provisions in nonmultilateral agreements have created
considerable tension between the intellectual property and human rights
systems. Even in areas where no direct conflicts or inconsistencies arise,
the agreements could distort the work of the international human rights
system by creating an undue emphasis on trade, economic partnerships,
and nonmultilateral approaches. They could also divert time, resources,
energy, and attention from the further development of the international
human rights system.
1. Intellectual Property v. Human Rights
Compared with the intellectual property system, the human rights
system has a distinctive culture, language, and forum structure, as well as
drastically different approaches to negotiation and conflict resolution.180
The position human rights advocates take often do not coincide with those
taken by intellectual property rights holders and their supportive
governments.181 The latter’s views are often colored by the trade-based—
180. As Professors Laurence Helfer and Graeme Austin explain:
Intellectual property commentators, especially those working in the AngloAmerican tradition, employ the analytical tools of utilitarianism and welfare
economics to evaluate the trade-offs between incentives and access and the
consequences for the individuals and firms that create, own, and consume
intellectual property products. The international human rights movement, by
contrast, engages in a discourse of absolutes that seeks to delineate the negative
and positive duties of states to respect and promote inalienable individual
freedoms. As a result, to label something as a “human right” often invokes—in
rhetoric if not always in reality—a language of trumps and unconditional
demands. This emphasis on categorical rights and responsibilities appears ill
suited to the rapidly changing technological and economic environment in which
intellectual property rules operate, an environment that often engenders calls for
incremental recalibrations of the balance between incentives and access.
HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 12, at 504; see also Land, supra note 170, at 1–2 (“Those in the
human rights movement are largely international lawyers, while the A2K movement is
predominantly composed of cyberlaw and intellectual property lawyers and technologists.”);
Audrey Chapman, A Human Rights Perspective on Intellectual Property, Scientific Progress, and
Access to the Benefits of Science, in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., PUB. NO. 762(E),
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 127, 128 (1998) (“Intellectual property lawyers tend
to have little involvement with human rights law, and few human rights specialists deal with science
and technology or intellectual property issues.”); Yu, supra note 11, at 1136 (noting that
transnational corporations “often find alien the human rights language and the forum structure”).
181. See Gervais, supra note 25, at 22 (“The response of the industry and the United States
Government thus far . . . point[] to additional trade-enforced restrictions on existing flexibilities that
would be successful in maintaining maximum protection and limiting access to products . . . sold by
the patent holder, but at a potentially high human and ethical cost. This seems like suboptimal
cohabitation [of intellectual property and human rights].”).
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and at times, trade-only—approach developed through the founding of the
WTO and the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. It is therefore no surprise
that commentators have heavily criticized the WTO panels and the
Appellate Body for failing to protect important human rights.182
Indeed, the tension between the WTO and the international human
rights system has led U.N. human rights bodies to heavily criticize the
TRIPS Agreement. For example, in Resolution 2000/7, the U.N. SubCommission stated that “the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement does
not adequately reflect the fundamental nature and indivisibility of all
human rights.”183 Noting the “apparent conflicts between the intellectual
property rights regime embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, on the one
hand, and international human rights law, on the other,”184 the SubCommission underscored the “social function of intellectual property”185
and reminded governments of “the primacy of human rights obligations
over economic policies and agreements.”186 The resolution also requested
“[g]overnments and national, regional and international economic policy
forums to take international human rights obligations and principles fully
into account in international economic policy formulation.”187
Likewise, Mary Robinson, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights, released a report highly critical of the TRIPS Agreement.188 The
report provided five observations concerning the potential challenge for
developing a human rights approach to the Agreement. First, the High
Commissioner noted:

182. See Tomer Broude, It’s Easily Done: The China—Intellectual Property Rights
Enforcement Dispute and the Freedom of Expression, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 660, 661 (2010)
(arguing that “contrary to any prior expectations of spontaneous confluence between trade,
intellectual property and human rights, the reasoning of [the WTO panel report on China—
Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights] is entirely
oblivious to the human rights implications of the dispute, and that it could even have negative
effects on the legal framework of the freedom of expression in China”); see also Robert Howse, The
Canadian Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous Times, 3 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 493, 496 (2000) (criticizing the WTO Panel for being “only interested in how much
the rights holder might lose, not in how much society might gain, from a given exception”); Ruth L.
Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 819, 914–15 (2003) (expressing disappointment that WTO panels, despite focusing
on the purpose and objective of the TRIPS Agreement and the context of the negotiations, “have
interpreted the provisions almost solely in light of the economic expectations of the private right
holders”).
183. Resolution 2000/7, supra note 20, ¶ 2.
184. Id.
185. Id. ¶ 5.
186. Id. ¶ 3.
187. Id. ¶ 4.
188. High Commissioner’s Report, supra note 25, ¶ 2.
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[T]he overall thrust of the TRIPS Agreement is the promotion
of innovation through the provision of commercial incentives.
The various links with the subject matter of human rights—
the promotion of public health, nutrition, environment and
development—are generally expressed in terms of exceptions
to the rule rather than the guiding principles themselves and
are made subject to the provisions of the Agreement.189
Second, “while the Agreement identifies the need to balance rights
with obligations, it gives no guidance on how to achieve this balance.”190
Although the TRIPS Agreement “sets out in considerable detail the content
of intellectual property rights”—such as the requirements for the grant of
rights, the duration of protection, and the modes of enforcement—it “only
alludes to the responsibilities of [intellectual property] holders that should
balance those rights in accordance with its own objectives. . . . [U]nlike the
rights it sets out, the Agreement does not establish the content of these
responsibilities, or how they should be implemented.”191
Third, because of the required minimum standards, the TRIPS
Agreement has taken away a high degree of autonomy and a considerable
amount of policy space from the WTO member states. The lack of such
autonomy, in turn, may affect their “abilities to promote and protect human
rights, including the right to development.”192 As the High Commissioner
reminded us, Article 2(3) of the Declaration on the Right to Development
provides:
States have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate
national development policies that aim at the constant
improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of
all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and
meaningful participation in development and in the fair
distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom.193
A fourth concern, related to the third, is that “the protection contained
in the TRIPS Agreement focuses on forms of protection that have

189. Id. ¶ 22; see also Sisule F. Musungu, Rethinking Innovation, Development and
Intellectual Property in the UN: WIPO and Beyond 4–5 (Quaker Int’l Affairs Programme, Ottawa,
TRIPS Issues Paper No. 5, 2005), available at http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Issues/
TRIPS53.pdf (“So far the only widely accepted notion has been that intellectual property is traderelated, justifying the TRIPS Agreement in the WTO but not the notion that intellectual property
rules are also education-related, health-related, defence-related and environment-related and so
forth.”).
190. High Commissioner’s Report, supra note 25, ¶ 23.
191. Id.
192. Id. ¶ 24.
193. Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 74, art. 2(3).
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developed in industrialized countries.”194 As a result, less developed
countries are required to offer protection that does not always take account
of local needs, interests, and conditions. Even worse, such protection may
significantly reduce a country’s ability to promote public health or
participation in development.
Finally, under the current international intellectual property system,
limited attention has been devoted to the protection of “the cultural
heritage and technology of local communities and indigenous peoples.”195
There are also growing concerns about the use of trade pressure to impose
TRIPS-plus legislation that could result in the development of “IP systems
that are inconsistent with States’ responsibilities under human rights
law.”196
Notwithstanding these concerns, the High Commissioner recognized
the flexibilities built into the TRIPS Agreement and noted that “much still
depends on how the . . . Agreement is actually implemented.”197 While
these flexibilities are important and may help retain the balance in the
international intellectual property system, it is important to remember that
countries need expertise and resources to take advantage of these
flexibilities. As UNCTAD reminded us in The Least Developed Countries
Report 2007:
Even with its inbuilt flexibilities, the TRIPS Agreement is
highly problematic for [least developed countries] owing to
the high transaction costs involved in complex and
burdensome procedural requirements for implementing and
enforcing appropriate national legal provisions. [These
countries] generally lack the relevant expertise and the
administrative capacity to implement them.198
In sum, as shown in the U.N. Sub-Commission’s and High
Commissioner’s analyses of the human rights impact of the TRIPS
Agreement, obligations in international intellectual property agreements—
including nonmultilateral agreements—could create tension between the
intellectual property system and the human rights system. Even if tension
does not exist on the surface, the obligations could mismatch the adopted
194. High Commissioner’s Report, supra note 25, ¶ 25.
195. Id. ¶ 26.
196. Id. ¶ 27.
197. Id. ¶ 28.
198. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], The Least Developed Countries Report
2007: Knowledge, Technological Learning and Innovation for Development, at 99, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/LDC/2007 (2007); accord Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II: Should Users
Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 25 (2004) (noting that many less developed countries lack
“experience with intellectual property protection [and] sufficient human capital (in the form of legal
talent) to codify wiggles into law”).
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standards and local conditions.199 They could also divert the scarce
economic resources from other important public needs. Such diversion is
particularly likely in the enforcement area.200
2. Bi/Plurilateral v. Multilateral
Although nonmultilateral agreements have created significant tension
between the intellectual property system and the human rights system, the
bilateral and plurilateral approaches used to establish these agreements
have raised additional concerns. By going outside the multilateral system,
nonmultilateral agreements have undermined the existing multilateral
approach to international norm-setting in both the intellectual property and
human rights arenas.201
As commentators have widely recognized, the development of the
highly controversial ACTA, the equally problematic TPP, and other
TRIPS-plus nonmultilateral agreements is not only an effort to strengthen
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, but also an
199. See Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-Anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 13,
42–50 (2006) (discussing the mismatch between the anticircumvention regime and the local
conditions of less developed countries); Yu, supra note 144, at 889–91 (discussing the mismatch
between the TRIPS Agreement and the local conditions of less developed countries).
200. See Carsten Fink, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: An Economic Perspective, in
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, ISSUE PAPER NO. 22, THE
GLOBAL DEBATE ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES xiii, 2 (2009) (“Governments need to make choices about how many resources to spend
on combating piracy, as opposed to enforcing other areas of law, building roads and bridges,
protecting national security, and providing other public goods. Such choices are usually not stated
in explicit terms, but they underlie every budgetary decision by federal and local governments.”);
see also Li Xuan & Carlos M. Correa, Towards a Development Approach on IP Enforcement:
Conclusions and Strategic Recommendations, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 207, 210 (Li Xuan & Carlos M. Correa eds., 2009) [hereinafter
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT] (noting that the demands for strengthened intellectual
property enforcement “seem to overlook the cost of the required actions, the different priorities that
exist in developing countries regarding the use of public funds (health and education would
normally be regarded as more urgent than IP enforcement) and the crucial fact that IPRs are private
rights and, hence, the burden and cost of their enforcement is to be borne by the right-holder, not
the public at large”); MUSUNGU, supra note 128, at 61 (“African and Pacific countries, learning
from the example of the CARIFORUM EPA, should approach proposals for additional obligations
on IP issues in their regions with utmost caution. Even in cases where the issues addressed have the
potential of development benefits, the overall obligations assumed may be too onerous for these
countries. This is the case, for example, with respect to the provisions on enforcement and on the
protection of geographical indications.”); Xue Hong, Enforcement for Development: Why Not an
Agenda for the Developing World?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT, supra, at 133, 143
(“Increment and strength of public enforcement measures will inevitably impose an economic
burden on the developing countries and divert the priorities of these countries, such as prosecution
of violent crimes or relief of poverty.”); Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2
WIPO J. 1, 2–6 (2010) (discussing the costs of strong intellectual property enforcement norms and
the resulting trade-offs).
201. See Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 1, at 976–77.
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indictment of the deficiencies in the TRIPS Agreement and the multilateral
approach used in completing the WTO rounds of trade negotiations.202 By
changing countries’ preferences for multilateral approaches, the
establishment of nonmultilateral agreements has therefore posed
significant challenges to the stability of both the international trading
system and the international human rights system.203 These bilateral and
plurilateral negotiations may further alienate a country’s trading partners,
making it more difficult for the country to undertake multilateral
discussions in the future.204
Even worse, by fragmenting the international regulatory system and
creating what Professor Jagdish Bhagwati and other commentators have
described as the “spaghetti bowl”205 or the “noodle bowl,”206 the continued
202. See Jeffery Atik, ACTA and the Destabilization of TRIPS, in SUSTAINABLE TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER: A GUIDE TO GLOBAL AID & TRADE DEVELOPMENT (121, 145 Hans Henrik Lidgard et al.
eds., 2012) (“ACTA is a critique of TRIPS—its very core signals a diagnosis that TRIPS
inadequately addressed the problem of IP enforcement.”); Yu, supra note 57, at 511–14 (noting that
ACTA was created in part to address the inadequacies and ineffectiveness of the TRIPS
enforcement provisions); Catherine Saez, ACTA a Sign of Weakness in Multilateral System, WIPO
Head Says, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 30, 2010, 6:18 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/
2010/06/30/acta-a-sign-of-weakness-in-multilateral-system-wipo-head-says/ (reporting the concern
of WIPO Director General Francis Gurry that countries are “taking matters into their own hands to
seek solutions outside of the multilateral system to the detriment of inclusiveness of the present
system”). See generally Yu, supra note 57 (providing a comprehensive discussion of why the
TRIPS enforcement provisions are inadequate and ineffective from the standpoint of developed
countries and intellectual property rights holders).
203. Cf. Chad Damro, The Political Economy of Regional Trade Agreements, in REGIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 23, 39–41 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino
eds., 2006) (discussing how regional trade agreements can serve as “political stumbling blocks” to
WTO multilateralism); Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 1, at 976 (noting that
nonmultilateral agreements “threaten to undermine the existing multilateral system”).
204. See Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference
in Cancún and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 219, 239 (2004) (“The inherent
discriminatory nature of bilateralism/regionalism is often blended with an internal power disparity
and ultimately begets unilateralism. Unilateralism, which is often clad with extraterritoriality, tends
to eclipse international trade law, thereby placing the global trading system at the mercy of bare
politics by a handful of powerful states.”); Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States
Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 297 (1991)
(arguing that bilateral agreements “may run counter to U.S. long-term interests for a healthy, stable
trade environment . . . [and] fragment the world trading system . . . [by creating] resentment,
particularly among Third World countries who view imposed bilateral agreements as a species of
colonialism”); Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 1, at 976 (noting that nonmultilateral
agreements can “alienate a country’s multilateral partners, resulting in distractions, or even
disengagement, that impede the progress of multilateral discussions”).
205. Jagdish Bhagwati, US Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas, in THE
DANGEROUS DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 1, 2–3 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Anne O.
Krueger eds., 1995); see also Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 1, at 978 & n.107 (noting the
creation of a “noodle bowl” in Asia).
206. See Wang Jiangyu, Association of Southeast Asian Nations–China Free Trade
Agreement, in BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 1, at 192, 224 (noting
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push for TRIPS-plus nonmultilateral agreements has forced countries to
divert scarce time, resources, energy, and attention from other international
intergovernmental initiatives, including the development of the
international human rights system.207 In less developed countries where
resources are scarce and personnel dedicated to the negotiation of
international human rights instruments may overlap with those involved in
the development of international intellectual property agreements, the
negotiation of nonmultilateral agreements will inevitably deplete resources
that can otherwise be used to strengthen human rights protection.
It is important to remember that not every country has the ability to
undertake discussions in a multitude of fora—in this case, in both
intellectual property and human rights fora and in both multilateral and
nonmultilateral fora. Even the United States or the European Union could
not devote the same amount of time, energy, and attention to the
multilateral process had it been asked to negotiate a large number of
bilateral and plurilateral agreements alongside the ongoing multilateral
negotiations.208 With significantly more limited resources, less developed
“‘Asian noodle bowl effect’ as highlighted by officials of the Asian Development Bank”); Yu, Sinic
Trade Agreements, supra note 1, at 978 (noting the creation of the “noodle bowl” or “curry bowl”
in Asia); Richard E. Baldwin, Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism
(Asian Dev. Bank, Working Paper on Regional Economic Integration No. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.adb.org/documents/papers/regional-economic-integration/WP07-Baldwin.pdf; Masahiro
Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja, Asian FTAs: Trends and Challenges 3 (Asian Dev. Bank, Working
Paper No. 144, 2009), available at http://www.adb.org/documents/Working-Papers/2010/
Economics-WP226.pdf (noting “a ‘noodle bowl’ problem of criss-crossing agreements that
potentially distort trade toward bilateral channels, excessive exclusions and special treatment in
FTAs, and the possibility that the multilateral trading system may be progressively eroded”).
207. As I noted in an earlier article:
In an ideal world, both the multilateral and bilateral processes should work in
tandem to maximize their strengths and effectiveness. Countries, therefore, should
continue to negotiate in a multilateral forum while at the same time seeking
enhancement through FTAs and EPAs. In reality, however, countries—especially
those in the less-developed world—have very limited resources. As a result, they
may not have the ability to dedicate efforts to normmaking in a multitude of
competing fora. Not even developed countries can devote the same amount of
energy and resources to the multilateral process if they also have to negotiate a
large number of bilateral and plurilateral agreements.
Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 1, at 977 (footnote omitted); see also Renato Ruggiero,
Comment, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 25, 26–27 (Jeffrey J. Schott
ed., 2004) [hereinafter FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS] (“Negotiating bilateral and regional agreements
can divert attention and effort from the Doha Round. This in turn can create a vicious cycle,
whereby a lack of progress at the WTO spurs a greater emphasis on bilateralism and regionalism,
which in turn further hampers efforts in Geneva.”).
208. See European Comm’n, Directorate-General for Trade, Strategy for the Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries, 2005 O.J. (C 129) 3, 5 (“It is important to identify a
limited number of countries on which the efforts of the Commission in the framework of the present
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countries most certainly would do much worse.
Moreover, as Professors Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs
insightfully observe, the growing proliferation of international regulatory
institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries could
help powerful countries preserve their dominance in the international
arena.209 The growing complexities could also result in what Professor Kal
Raustiala describes as “strategic inconsistenc[ies],” which help alter,
undermine, or put pressure on unfavorable norms in the international
human rights system.210 Such complexities could further upset the existing
coalition dynamics between international actors and institutions, thereby
threatening to reduce the bargaining power and influence less developed
strategy should be concentrated. The human and financial resources allocated to the enforcement of
IPR being limited, it is unrealistic to pretend that our action can extend equally to all, or even most,
of the countries where piracy and counterfeiting occur.” (citation and footnote omitted)); Jeffrey J.
Schott, Free Trade Agreements: Boon or Bane of the World Trading System?, in FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS, supra note 207, at 3, 16 (pointing out that resource scarcity equally “affects US
negotiators, whose budget is inadequate to meet the extensive demands set out in US Trade
Promotion Authority by their congressional masters”); see also id. (“If WTO talks face tough
sledding, [FTA critics’] counsel is to redouble efforts at most favored nation reforms rather than to
create new distortions via competing preferential regimes.”); Richard N. Cooper, Comment, in FREE
TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 207, at 20, 23 (“The United States ought to devote its negotiating
and political energies to getting a successful conclusion to the multilateral negotiations, currently
the Doha Round and some unfinished business from the Uruguay Round.”); Damro, supra note
203, at 42 (noting that multilateral liberalization could slow down “as governments shift attention
and resources toward the negotiation of regional agreements”).
209. Professors Benvenisti and Downs describe three ways in which the growing proliferation
of international regulatory institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries has
helped powerful states preserve their dominance:
First, [fragmentation] limits the ability of weaker states to engage in the logrolling
that is necessary for them to bargain more effectively with more powerful
states. . . . Second, by creating a multitude of competing institutions with
overlapping responsibilities, fragmentation provides powerful states with the
opportunity to abandon—or threaten to abandon—any given venue for a more
sympathetic venue if their demands are not met. . . . Third, a fragmented system’s
piecemeal character suggests an absence of design and obscures the role of
intentionality. . . . This has helped obscure the fact that fragmentation is in part the
result of a calculated strategy by powerful states to create a legal order that both
closely reflects their interests and that only they have the capacity to alter.
Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the
Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 597–98 (2007).
210. See Raustiala, supra note 35, at 1027–28 (stating that strategic inconsistencies “‘occur[]
when actors deliberately seek to create inconsistency via a new rule crafted in another forum in an
effort to alter or put pressure on an earlier rule’”); Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 1, at 979
(“The more bilateral and plurilateral agreements there are, the more opportunities there will be for
powerful and geopolitically savvy countries to develop such inconsistencies.”); see also Laurence
R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual
Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 14 (2004) (discussing legal inconsistencies generated
by development of counter-regime norms).
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countries have obtained through past coalition-building initiatives.211
IV. RECONCILIATION AND ADJUSTMENTS
To reconcile the conflicts and inconsistencies, and to alleviate the
tensions, between the intellectual property system and the human rights
system, this Part proposes two different sets of adjustments. The first set
focuses on the normative challenges identified in Part III.B. The second set
responds to the systemic challenges discussed in Part III.C.
A. Normative Adjustments
As discussed earlier, some attributes of intellectual property rights are
protected by international human rights instruments. A satisfactory
resolution of the tension between the intellectual property and human
rights systems therefore requires a careful delineation of the different
attributes of intellectual property rights.212 After all, the CESCR stated
clearly that, “[i]n contrast to human rights, intellectual property rights are
generally of a temporary nature, and can be revoked, licensed or assigned
to someone else.”213
From the human rights standpoint, there are two different types of
conflicts: external and internal.214 External conflicts arise at the
intersection between human rights and the non-human rights aspects of
intellectual property protection. Internal conflicts, by contrast, arise at the
intersection between rights protecting the human rights attributes of
intellectual property and other forms of human rights. These conflicts take
place within the human rights system even though they also implicate
intellectual property protection.

211. See Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of
Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 315, 373 (2003) (“[T]o the extent regime shifting upsets coalitional dynamics between
developing countries, the loss on the development side is actually doubled. Not only is there a
dilution of a normative proposition, however subtle, but there is also the political loss resulting
from splinters between developing countries whose membership in various regimes may be
different, or whose position on issues within the regimes may differ.”); see also Yu, supra note 14,
at 17–18 (discussing how “the increased complexity of the international intellectual property regime
has upset existing coalition dynamics between actors and institutions within the regime complex”);
Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 1, at 981 (“[B]y taking away these countries’ ability to
form coalitions, FTAs and EPAs have generally made less-developed countries more vulnerable
than in a multilateral setting.” (footnote omitted)).
212. See Yu, supra note 11, at 1128.
213. General Comment No. 17, supra note 27, ¶ 2.
214. In addition to these two sets of conflicts, which are true conflicts, it is also worth noting
the possibilities for false conflicts (similar to those identified by conflict of law scholars). One
commentator, for example, contends that market failures can precipitate false conflicts. See Sharon
E. Foster, The Conflict Between the Human Right to Education and Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 287, 305–06.
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1. External Conflicts
With respect to external conflicts, countries can consider the
introduction of limitations and exceptions either within the intellectual
property system or without. Such limitations and exceptions are consistent
with the existing international human rights instruments. Article 4 of the
ICESCR provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in
the enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in
conformity with the present Covenant, the State may subject
such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law
only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of
these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the
general welfare in a democratic society.215
Article 25 further states: “Nothing in the present Covenant shall be
interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and
utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.”216
Externally, countries can embrace the principle of human rights
primacy that the U.N. Sub-Commission outlined in Resolution 2000/7.217
In the event of a conflict between intellectual property rights and human
rights, countries can ensure proper protection of human rights by using
certain human rights to preempt intellectual property rights. For example,
the rights to life and health can be used to safeguard against the overprotection of pharmaceutical patents or clinical trial data.218 To some
extent, greater utilization of the human rights system may help less
developed countries uphold the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement. Such
utilization may also allow these countries to “claw back” some of the
concessions they made during the TRIPS negotiations.219
215. ICESCR, supra note 28, art. 4; see also UDHR, supra note 32, art. 29(2) (“In the exercise
of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by
law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of
others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society.”).
216. ICESCR, supra note 28, art. 25.
217. See Resolution 2000/7, supra note 20, ¶¶ 2, 3 (reminding governments “of the primacy of
human rights obligations over economic policies and agreements” and the importance of other
human rights, such as the right to food and the right to health); Yu, supra note 11, at 1092–93
(discussing the principle of human rights primacy).
218. Given their lack of basis in human rights instruments, rights in clinical trial data will be
more easily preempted by human rights than patent rights, which contain at least some human rights
attributes. See supra Part III.A.
219. See Raustiala, supra note 35, at 1036 (“[T]here are significant efforts to use human rights
instruments and concepts to roll back some of the more egregious elements of TRIPS.”); cf.
JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7
(2001) (suggesting that a constructive resolution of ambiguities in the TRIPS Agreement may
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Nevertheless, authors, inventors, and their corporate owners may abuse
the human rights system. “Because those attributes or forms of intellectual
property rights that do not have a human rights basis are likely to be
deemed less important through a human rights lens,”220 without proper
safeguards, preemption based on the principle of human rights primacy
could significantly reduce the incentives generated by the existing
intellectual property system. As Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss
cautions:
Elevating intellectual property rights to human rights has
unfortunate pragmatic consequences. Presumably, human
rights can be outweighed only by other human rights.
Accordingly, under a human rights approach, the benefit
stream flowing from inventive production can be distributed,
without a patentee’s authorization, only to meet social needs
that are likewise classified as fundamental. (Or to put it
another way, every incursion on a patent right would need to
be justified by showing that it involved an interest that is not
only socially desirable, but that can also be categorized as a
human right.) Instead of relying on legislatures and courts to
wield well-understood tools embedded in existing patent law,
ad hoc rights-balancing leads to unpredictable decisionmaking. The result, ironically, is an environment less
conducive to decisions to invest time and money in
intellectual efforts. The new—human rights—justification
can, in short, thwart the traditional—utilitarian—goal of
limiting protection from free riders as a means of encouraging
the advancement of knowledge.221
Internally, countries can also proactively introduce limitations and
exceptions into the intellectual property system. In the area of access to
essential medicines, for example, countries can introduce provisions that
facilitate compulsory licensing, parallel importation, or government use.222
They can also introduce exemptions from patent protection for early
working, research, and development of diagnostics,223 or provisions
provide less developed countries with a “means of ‘clawing’ back much of what was lost in the
negotiating battles in TRIPS”).
220. See Yu, supra note 39, at 712.
221. Dreyfuss, supra note 78, at 74.
222. See generally HESTERMEYER, supra note 106, at 229–55 (discussing TRIPS flexibilities in
relation to the protection of human rights); ELLEN F.M. ‘T HOEN, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF
PHARMACEUTICAL MONOPOLY POWER: DRUG PATENTS, ACCESS, INNOVATION AND THE APPLICATION
OF THE WTO DOHA DECLARATION ON TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 39–59 (2009) (discussing
compulsory licenses and parallel importation in relation to flexibilities under the TRIPS
Agreement).
223. See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
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facilitating the production, importation, or use of generic substitutes.224 In
addition, as the CESCR suggested, countries can introduce complementary
measures to improve access to essential medicines “through the exchange
of price information, price competition and price negotiation with public
procurement and insurance schemes, price controls, reduced duties and
taxes and improved distribution efficiency, reduced distribution and
dispensing costs and reduced marketing expenses.”225
Countries can further introduce safeguard provisions to ensure better
protection of human rights. A recent example is Article 27 of ACTA,
which, as a compromise, includes safeguard clauses in three sub-provisions
to preserve “fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, fair
process, and privacy.”226 Although these clauses may be a redeeming
feature of this controversial treaty, it remains to be seen whether they can
alleviate the tension between intellectual property and human rights. After
all, ACTA member states, especially the powerful ones, could deem the
safeguard provisions “merely hortatory,” as they did in regard to Articles 7
and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and to the Doha Declaration.227 The
effectiveness of these safeguard clauses could also be undermined by a
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 50 (2002) (discussing the importance of the Bolar exception,
which “makes it legal for a generic producer to import, manufacture and test a patented product
prior to the expiry of the patent in order that it may fulfil the regulatory requirements imposed by
particular countries as necessary for marketing as a generic”).
224. See High Commissioner’s Report, supra note 25, ¶ 49 (stating that “access to affordable
drugs can be improved by encouraging the production of generic substitutes”).
225. Id. ¶ 46. In a previous article, I also wrote:
[I]f human rights are to be effectively and meaningfully protected, states not only
need to broker human rights-based compulsory licenses, but also have to introduce
legislation and institutions to prevent exorbitant pricing, anticompetitive behavior,
and other market abuses. Examples of such remedial measures include compulsory
licensing, price control, competition laws, government procurement and subsidies,
voluntary cooperation, and international assistance and cooperation.
Yu, supra note 11, at 1101 (footnote omitted).
226. ACTA, supra note 1, arts. 27.2–.4.
227. See CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A
COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 93 (2007) (“Some observers have read ‘should’ to mean
that Article 7 is a mere hortary [sic] provision, the interpretative value of which is equivalent to that
of any preambular provision.”); JACQUES J. GORLIN, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PHARMACEUTICALRELATED PROVISIONS OF THE WTO TRIPS (INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY) AGREEMENT 16 (1999)
(stating that “according to United States and EC negotiators, the language of Article 7 is hortatory
and does not have any operational significance” and that Article 8 “was viewed by developed
country negotiators throughout most of the negotiations as being non-operational and hortatory”
(citing interviews with Mike Kirk and Peter Carl)); Chon, supra note 164, at 2843 (“[T]he language
referencing development in TRIPS is not mandatory, but rather hortatory . . . .”); Peter K. Yu, The
Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 1003 (2009) (discussing
how the choice of the word “should” in Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement “has led some industry
groups and commentators to argue that the provision is ‘mere hortatory’”).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/6

50

Yu and Yu: Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era

2012]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

1095

member state’s insistence that the human rights conflicts have been
internally resolved through the flexibilities built into the intellectual
property system.
A better alternative, therefore, is for countries to clearly delineate the
limitations or exceptions available to individuals. Article 6(4) of the EU
Information Society Directive, for instance, states:
Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that
rightholders make available to the beneficiary of [the
specified] exception or limitation provided for in national
law . . . the means of benefiting from that exception or
limitation, to the extent necessary to benefit from that
exception or limitation and where that beneficiary has legal
access to the protected work or subject-matter concerned.228
Such a clearly delineated exception not only strikes a better balance in the
intellectual property system, but also ensures the proper recognition of the
human rights interests in individual users.
2. Internal Conflicts
With respect to internal conflicts, resolution will require more
complicated approaches. In an earlier work, I outlined three different
approaches that can be used to resolve these conflicts: (1) just
remuneration; (2) core minimum; and (3) progressive realization.229 For the
purposes of this Article, the most important approach is just
228. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on
the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society,
art. 6(4), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 17–18.
229. See Yu, supra note 11, at 1094–1123. As I noted earlier:
The just remuneration approach is ideal for situations involving an inevitable
conflict between two human rights—for example, between the right to the
protection of interests in intellectual creations and the right to freedom of
expression. Under this approach, authors and inventors hold a right to
remuneration (rather than exclusive control) while individuals obtain a human
rights-based compulsory license (as compared to a free license). The core
minimum approach, in contrast, provides guidance on the minimum essential
levels of protection a state has to offer to comply with its human rights
obligations. That approach seeks to balance the state’s obligations against the
inevitable constraints created by a scarcity of natural and economic resources.
Finally, the progressive realization approach offers insight into the non-competing
relationship amongst the different rights protected in international or regional
human rights treaties. This final approach is important, because human rights are
not only universal entitlements, but also empowerment rights—rights that enable
individuals to benefit from other equally important rights.
Yu, supra note 39, at 712–13 (footnotes omitted).
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remuneration,230 which is specially designed for situations involving an
unavoidable conflict between two sets of human rights. Under this
approach, authors and inventors hold only a right to remuneration, as
opposed to maintaining exclusive control; meanwhile, individuals obtain a
human rights-based compulsory license, as compared with a free
license).231
Consider, for example, a conflict involving a newspaper’s freedom of
expression and the author’s moral and material interests in his or her
creation, as illustrated by the famous English case of Ashdown v.
Telegraph Group Ltd.232 If the publication of a news account is of
significant public interest and high political value (for example, when the
author is a public figure), the human rights interest in freedom of
expression will ensure the publication of the news account. Meanwhile, the
author will receive proper compensation for the injury to the creative
interest through the introduction of a human right-based compulsory
license. Although this outcome may not please either party, it strikes a
reasonable compromise from the human rights standpoint.
Moreover, although international and regional human rights
agreements offer protection to the material interests in intellectual
creations, such protection may not reach the level stipulated in intellectual
property, trade, or investment agreements. As the CESCR reminds us, the
ICESCR merely covers the “basic material interests which are necessary to
enable authors [and inventors] to enjoy an adequate standard of living.”233
Thus, once an author or inventor has obtained an adequate standard of
living, the human rights system may not offer additional protection.
B. Systemic Adjustments
1. Human Rights Impact Assessments
At the systemic level, countries can consider building the necessary
230. See Yu, supra note 11, at 1095–1105 (elaborating on the just remuneration approach).
231. See Yu, supra note 39, at 712; Yu, supra note 11, at 1096–99; see also Alan B. Bennett,
Reservation of Rights for Humanitarian Uses, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN
HEALTH AND AGRICULTURE INNOVATION 41, 41 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds., 2007) (discussing
ways to reserve rights to meet the needs of developing countries for other humanitarian purposes);
Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 301, 350–51
(2011) (discussing “‘humanitarian licensing’”).
232. [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1142 (Eng.). The case “concerned the publication by the Sunday
Telegraph of a yet-to-be-published minute written by Paddy Ashdown, the former leader of the
Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom, of his secret meeting with Prime Minister Tony Blair
shortly after the 1997 general elections.” Yu, supra note 11, at 1096. The meeting concerned the
political cooperation between the Labor Party and the Liberal Democrats after the elections.
Ashdown sued the newspaper for breach of confidence and copyright infringement. The newspaper
defended by “invok[ing] both the usual defenses of fair dealing and public interest and a novel
defense based on the newly enacted Human Rights Act of 1998.” Id. at 1096–97.
233. General Comment No. 17, supra note 27, ¶ 2.
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infrastructure to promote the protection of human rights. For example, a
country can demand the inclusion of human rights impact assessments
before the adoption of new nonmultilateral agreements or the introduction
of new legislation that seeks to implement those agreements.234 The
country can also demand such assessments for a specified period following
the introduction of the legislation,235 although an ex post review is likely to
be less effective than an ex ante review.236
To be certain, human rights impact assessments are not easy to
conduct, especially when some attributes of the intellectual property rights
at issue have human rights status. Nevertheless, countries often undertake
such assessments when they file reports with the monitoring arms of the
U.N. human rights bodies. As far as quantitative assessments are
concerned, countries can rely on indicators provided internally by national
or local governments and nongovernmental organizations or externally by
the U.N., the World Bank, OECD, or other intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations.237
Thus far, impact assessments of law and policy have remained rare and
piecemeal. Nevertheless, they have become increasingly common not only
in the human rights field, but also in the areas of public health and
234. See HARRISON, supra note 92, at 233 (“If States were to conduct human rights-compliant
impact assessments as a key component of the negotiating process of any new trade agreement, this
would be an important step in ensuring that trade law rules protect and promote human rights.”);
WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT 52 (2012) (noting the need for “mandatory,
independently-produced, impartial, empirically rigorous impact statements before any new
copyright legislation is passed”).
235. See id. at 229 (“The EU methodology . . . contains provisions requiring ‘ex post
monitoring, evaluation and follow up of trade agreements’ so that ongoing impacts of trade
agreements can be evaluated once the agreement in question is actually in force.” (quoting
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL TRADE, HANDBOOK FOR TRADE
SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 9 (2006), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2006/march/tradoc_127974.pdf)); PATRY, supra note 234, at 52 (noting the need for “impact
statements for existing laws so that we know whether existing laws need to be amended or
repealed”).
236. See Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 777,
799–801 (2010) (criticizing the EU ex post evaluation of its Database Directive and distributing
recommendations based on such an evaluation); James Boyle, Two Database Cheers for the EU,
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2006), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/99610a50-7bb2-11da-ab8e-0000779e2340.html
(discussing the European Commission’s first report on the Directive).
237. The U.N. indicators, compiled by the United Nations Statistical Division, are available at
U.N. STAT. DIVISION, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2012). The
International Human Development Indications, compiled by the United Nations Development
Programme, are available at Human Development Reports, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME,
http://hdr.undp.org/en/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2012). The World Bank’s World Development
Indicators are available at Data, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator (last visited Feb.
3, 2012). Some commentators have also called for the development of “human rights
indicators . . . with specific relevance to trade agreements and their impacts.” HARRISON, supra note
92, at 235.
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biological diversity.238 Assessment, evaluation, and impact studies also
constitute one of the six clusters of recommendations adopted by WIPO as
part of its Development Agenda in October 2007.239
Notwithstanding the growing popularity and wider adoption of human
rights impact assessments, one should keep these developments in
perspective. As Professor James Harrison reminds us: “The fact that
impact assessments have been undertaken does not mean . . . that
governments will necessarily act to resolve any conflicts that are revealed
in their international legal obligations.”240 It is also worth remembering
that “developing countries may not have the capacity or infrastructure to
undertake assessments by themselves.”241
2. Monitoring Mechanisms
Countries can also take advantage of the existing human rights
infrastructure to monitor the impact of intellectual property rights on the
protection of human rights. For example, commentators have suggested the
use of monitoring mechanisms to alleviate the tension between intellectual

238. See, e.g., General Comment No. 17, supra note 27, ¶ 35 (“States parties
should . . . consider undertaking human rights impact assessments prior to the adoption and after a
period of implementation of legislation for the protection of the moral and material interests
resulting from one’s scientific, literary or artistic productions.”); Convention on Biological
Diversity art. 14(1)(a), June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143 (requiring contracting parties to
“[i]ntroduce appropriate procedures requiring environmental impact assessment of its proposed
projects that are likely to have significant adverse effects on biological diversity with a view to
avoiding or minimizing such effects and, where appropriate, allow for public participation in such
procedures”); COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 10 (2006)
(stating that “health policies, as well as inter alia those addressing trade, the environment and
commerce, should be equally subject to assessments as to their impact on the right to health”);
HARRISON, supra note 92, at 228 (“Systematic environmental assessments of trade agreements are
relatively common. Norway, the US and Canada all carry out reviews of the environmental impact
of trade policies which include some international impact assessment, as do the United Nations
Environment Programme and World Wildlife Fund.”).
239. See The 45 Adopted Recommendations Under the WIPO Development Agenda, Cluster
D: Assessment, Evaluation and Impact Studies, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2012)
(outlining recommendations within the assessment, evaluation, and impact studies cluster).
240. HARRISON, supra note 92, at 233. Nevertheless, as Professor Harrison acknowledges:
[S]uch impact assessments can make the general public aware of the negative
human rights impact of signing up to particular trade obligations, and become the
basis for opposition parties, and domestic and international civil society groups,
campaigning for changes to agreements to make them compatible with
international human rights obligations.
Id.
241. Id. at 234.
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property and human rights.242 Such monitoring can occur at both the
international and domestic levels.243 In addition to national governments
and international intergovernmental organizations, it can also involve
individuals, communities, and the private sector.
While these monitoring mechanisms may not be as powerful as a
mandatory conflict resolution procedure, they have significant benefits. As
Professor Molly Beutz Land explains:
Although these institutions do not have the ability to sanction
or reward states based on their records of compliance other
than by publishing conclusions regarding the state’s
compliance, the very act of a state reporting to a committee
fosters greater transparency, provides human rights
organizations with an opportunity to expose and challenge
state actions and decisions, and forces the state to provide
reasons for its conduct.244

242. See High Commissioner’s Report, supra note 25, ¶ 61 (encouraging “States to monitor
the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement to ensure that its minimum standards are achieving
this balance between the interests of the general public and those of the authors” and supporting the
WHO’s statement that “‘countries are advised to carefully monitor the implementation of the TRIPS
Agreement in order to formulate comprehensive proposals for the future review of the TRIPS
Agreement’” (quoting World Health Org., Globalization, TRIPS and Access to Pharmaceuticals,
WHO POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON MEDICINES, Mar. 2001, available at http://apps.who.int/
medicinedocs/pdf/s2240e/s2240e.pdf)); see also Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 338–40 (1997)
(providing an overview of the reporting process used by the U.N. Human Rights Committee, which
is charged with the supervision of states parties’ compliance with the ICCPR).
243. As James Harrison states:
It is important that impact assessments are conducted both at the international and
national level. Individual countries need to undertake human rights assessments of
trade liberalisation policies, and utilise these assessments in a variety of different
ways, including[:] in WTO negotiations over future commitments; to revise their
national policies so as to ensure they are in accordance with international human
rights obligations; and as a defence to actions brought by other States in dispute
settlement proceedings alleging breaches of WTO obligations. They should also
present the information obtained before relevant Committees of the WTO.
Individual national assessments need to be complemented by international
assessments which can uncover trends at the regional or global level about how
particular trade rules are impacting upon human rights in particular ways. This
will lead to better identification of where national impact assessments should be
focused.
HARRISON, supra note 92, at 227 (footnotes omitted).
244. Land, supra note 170, at 29–30; see also Edith Brown Weiss, Understanding Compliance
with International Environmental Agreements: The Baker’s Dozen Myths, 32 U. RICH. L. REV.
1555, 1573–76 (1999) (evaluating the importance of reporting obligations in the context of
international environmental treaties).
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CONCLUSION
In the past decade, high- and middle-income countries have pushed
aggressively for the establishment of bilateral, plurilateral, and regional
trade and investment agreements. Thus far, the high standards for
intellectual property protection and enforcement incorporated into these
agreements have raised significant tension between the intellectual
property and human rights systems. While some provisions in the
agreements arguably have strengthened those attributes of intellectual
property rights that have human rights status, others have created
considerable impediments to the protection of human rights. It is therefore
imperative that countries strike a more appropriate balance between the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights and the
commitments made in international or regional human rights instruments.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/6

56

